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Welcome to the Michigan Auto No-Fault Law Digital Library

The Michigan No-Fault Act was adopted in 1973, and since then, there have been over 4000 Michigan appellate court opinions regarding the law. Sinas Dramis Law Firm has written case summaries regarding virtually all these opinions and continues to do so at the present time. The Michigan Auto No-Fault Law Digital Library is a compilation of all the case summaries from Sinas Dramis Law Firm. The case summaries are freely provided to further our goal of educating the public about the Michigan Auto No-Fault Law.

The Digital Library is fully searchable. Therefore, searching by case name or relevant terms is a good way to find the case summary and opinion. There is also an indexing system that allows you to find a case through a statutory indextopical indexalphabetical index, or chronological index.


To make it easy for the public to understand the latest developments in the law, the recent case summaries are listed below.

Recent Cases

Mickens v Meemic Ins Co, et al (COA – UNP 12/28/2021; RB #4373)
In this 2-1 unpublished per curiam decision (Borrello, dissenting), the Court of Appeals affirmed the trial court’s summary disposition order dismissing Plaintiff Julia Mickens’s third-party action against Defendant Suburban Mobility Authority for Regional Transportation (“SMART”) on governmental immunity grounds.  The majority held that Mickens failed to present any evidence that might create a question of fact as to whether SMART’s employee, April Nickerson, was negligent in her operation of the SMART bus that was involved in the subject motor vehicle collision.   

Powell, et al v Progressive Mich Ins Co (COA – UNP 12/21/2021; RB #436964)   
In this unanimous unpublished per curiam decision, the Court of Appeals affirmed the trial court’s summary disposition order dismissing Plaintiff Joshua Powell’s first-party action against Defendant Progressive Michigan Insurance Company (“Progressive”).  Powell was statutorily entitled to no-fault PIP benefits under his brother’s policy with Progressive, but after the subject motor vehicle collision, Progressive rescinded the brother’s policy on the basis of fraud and informed Powell there was no valid coverage in effect with Progressive at the time of the collision.  Powell then applied for no-fault PIP benefits through them Michigan Assigned Claims Plan, who assigned his claims to Farmers.  After reaching a settlement in a separate first-party action against Farmers Insurance Exchange (“Farmers”), Powell filed a first-party action against Progressive, seeking payment of additional no-fault PIP benefits that had accrued prior to the settlement and release with Farmers, arguing that he was entitled to said benefits because Progressive committed actionable fraud in leading him to believe that his brother’s policy had been rescinded with respect to his claims under it.  The Court of Appeals held that Powell failed to present any evidence that Progressive made any fraudulent misrepresentation and, alternatively, that his claims against Progressive were barred by the one-year-back rule.

Brown v Ayers, et al (COA – UNP 12/21/2021; RB #4370)   
In this unanimous unpublished per curiam decision, the Court of Appeals affirmed the trial court’s summary disposition order dismissing Defendant Citizens Insurance Company of the Midwest (“Citizens”) from Plaintiff Lena Brown’s first-party action against both Citizens and Defendant Berkshire Hathaway Homestate Insurance Company (“Berkshire”).  The Court of Appeals held that the trial court properly dismissed Citizens—the insurer to which Brown’s claim for PIP benefits arising out of the subject motor vehicle collision was assigned by the Michigan Assigned Claims Plan—from the lawsuit because Berkshire was higher in priority for payment of Brown’s benefits.  Furthermore, the Court held that, because Brown failed to exercise due diligence in attempting to identify a higher priority insurer before turning to the MACP, the proper course of action for the trial court was to dismiss Citizens altogether, as opposed to ordering Citizens to continue paying Brown’s benefits and then seeking reimbursement from the higher priority insurer, as was the Court of Appeals’ prescription in a similar, albeit distinguishable, situation in Spencer v Citizens Ins Co, 239 Mich App 291 (2000).Lena Brown sustained injuries when she was hit by a car owned by Legacy Medical Transportation, LLC (“Legacy”), driven by Anthony Ayers.  Brown contacted Legacy afterward and asked it to provide her with its no-fault insurance information and was allegedly told by Legacy that it was insured by Ameriprise.  After Brown was informed by Ameriprise that it did not insure the vehicle that struck her, Brown filed an application for benefits with the MACP, who assigned her claim to Citizens.  Citizens paid Brown’s benefits until Brown filed a first-party action, seeking additional benefits, against Citizens, Ayers, and Legacy, in which Citizens discovered early on that Berkshire insured either Ayers or Legacy and was therefore the insurer of highest priority.  Citizens and Berkshire ultimately reached an agreement which would have dismissed Citizens from the case, but Brown did not agree to the language for a stipulated order doing so.  The trial court ultimately did dismiss Citizens from the case, however, and further ruled that Brown could not seek payment of any unpaid benefits that accrued in the two months immediately following the collision because of the one-year-back rule, meaning that Brown assumed personal responsibility for a $166,000 ERISA lien being enforced against her.

State Farm Mut Auto Ins Co v Protective Ins Co (COA – UNP 12/21/2021; RB #437264)   
In this unanimous unpublished per curiam decision, the Court of Appeals affirmed the trial court’s summary disposition order in favor of Plaintiff State Farm Mutual Automobile Insurance Company (“State Farm”) in State Farm’s action for reimbursement from Defendant Protective Insurance Company (“Protective”) for half the total amount of no-fault PIP benefits it paid to a motorcyclist, Robert Rader, after Rader was injured in an accident involving two motor vehicles.  The Court of Appeals held that the vehicle driven by Protective’s insured was “involved” in the subject accident for purposes of MCL 500.3114(5) by virtue of the fact that Rader’s body was thrown against it while it was passively stopped at a red light, after Rader first crashed into a vehicle insured by State Farm.  Therefore, the Court held that Protective and State Farm were equal priority insurers under MCL 500.3114(5) and that Protective was responsible for half of Rader’s PIP benefits.

Rush v Allstate Fire and Cas Ins Co (COA – UNP 12/21/2021; RB #4371)
In this unanimous unpublished per curiam decision, the Court of Appeals reversed the trial court’s summary disposition order dismissing Plaintiff Eric Rush’s first-party action against Defendant Allstate Fire & Casualty Insurance Company (“Allstate”).  The Court of Appeals held that a question of fact existed as to whether Toron and Deshalon Brownlee, who were named insureds on a no-fault insurance policy issued by Allstate, were constructive owners of a vehicle titled and registered in their son’s name and which their son was driving when he crashed into Rush, a pedestrian who did not have his own no-fault insurance policy.  As a result, the Court held that a question of fact existed as to whether, based on the priority rules set forth in MCL 500.3115 prior to the no-fault reforms passed under 2019 Public Acts 21 and 22, Allstate was higher in the order of priority for payment of Rush’s no-fault PIP benefits related to the injuries he sustained in the subject accident.

Carter v Progressive Mich Ins Co (COA – UNP 12/16/2021; RB #4367)  
In this unanimous unpublished per curiam decision, the Court of Appeals affirmed the trial court’s summary disposition order dismissing Plaintiff Drucilla Marie Carter’s third-party action seeking uninsured motorist coverage against Defendant Progressive Michigan Insurance Company (“Progressive”).  The Court of Appeals held that Carter failed to satisfy the first and third prongs of the test for establishing a serious impairment of body function set forth in McCormick v Carrier, 487 Mich 180 (2010).  Specifically, the Court held that Carter failed to establish that she suffered an objectively manifested impairment that was caused by the subject motor vehicle crash, and that she failed to establish that any alleged impairments caused by the crash affected her general ability to lead her normal life.

Chahine v Memberselect Ins Co, et al (COA – UNP 12/16/2021; RB #4366)  
In this unanimous unpublished per curiam decision, the Court of Appeals affirmed the trial court’s summary disposition order in which it determined that Defendant Memberselect Insurance Company (“MIC”) was the highest priority insurer for payment of Plaintiff Ali Chahine’s no-fault PIP benefits.  The Court of Appeals held that Chahine was domiciled at his parents’ house in Dearborn, Michigan at the time subject incident—in which he was injured while alighting from a rental car—and that Chahine’s parents’ no-fault insurer, MIC, was therefore the highest priority insurer pursuant to MCL 500.3114(1).  

Garvish v Brown, et al (COA – UNP 12/16/2021; RB #4365)   
In this unanimous unpublished per curiam decision (Shapiro, concurring), the Court of Appeals affirmed the trial court’s summary disposition order dismissing Plaintiff Galina Garvish’s third-party action against Defendant Don Andre Brown.  The Court of Appeals held that Garvish failed to present sufficient evidence to create a question of fact as to whether she sustained a serious impairment of body function under McCormick v Carrier, 487 Mich 180 (2010).  Specifically, the Court of Appeals held that Garvish failed to satisfy the first prong of the McCormick test—requiring that she demonstrate that she suffered an objectively manifested impairment—and failed to establish that any impairments she did have were caused by the subject motor vehicle collision.  

Dodd, et al v Allstate Fire and Cas Ins Co (COA – UNP 12/16/2021; RB #4364) 
In this unanimous unpublished per curiam decision, the Court of Appeals affirmed the trial court’s summary disposition order regarding certain aspects of Plaintiffs Donna Dodd’s and Kelly Oliver’s claims for no-fault benefits from Defendant Allstate Fire and Casualty Insurance Company (“Allstate”) arising out of injuries the two sustained while occupying a motorcycle that struck a motor vehicle in Ohio.  The Court of Appeals held that, under the terms of Oliver’s no-fault policy, Oliver and Dodd could not “double dip,” or receive duplicate payments for the same medical expenses, from both their health insurers and Allstate.  The Court of Appeals further held that, under the plain language of MCL 500.3111, Dodd could recover no-fault benefits under Oliver’s Allstate policy because the motorcycle constituted a “vehicle” for purposes of entitlement under that statutory subsection.

Binns, et al v Pickens, et al (COA – UNP 12/16/2021; RB #4362)   
In this unanimous unpublished per curiam decision, the Court of Appeals reversed the trial court’s denial of Defendant City of Detroit’s motion for summary disposition, in which the City of Detroit sought dismissal of Plaintiff Nicole Binns’s third-party action against it under the motor vehicle exception to governmental immunity.  The Court of Appeals held that the facts did not support the application of the doctrine of res ipsa loquitor, and since Binns’s allegation that the City of Detroit’s bus driver was negligent in causing her injuries was based entirely on the doctrine of res ipsa loquitor, summary disposition should have been granted in the City of Detroit’s favor.

LM Gen Ins Co v Hartford Ins Co, et al (COA – UNP 12/16/2021; RB #4361) 
In this 2-1 unpublished per curiam decision (Letica, dissenting), the Court of Appeals reversed the trial court’s summary disposition order dismissing Plaintiff LM General Insurance Company’s (“LM General”) action against Defendant Trumbull Insurance Company (“Trumbull”), in which LM sought reimbursement from Trumbull for no-fault benefits it accidentally paid to Trumbull’s insured despite Trumbull being the highest priority insurer with respect to its insured’s claim.  The Court of Appeals held that the one-year-back rule, MCL 500.3145(1), did not apply to LM’s action for reimbursement from Trumbull.  

Davis, et al v Nationwide Prop & Cas Ins Co, et al (COA – UNP 12/2/2021; RB #4360)
In this 2-1 unpublished per curiam decision (Borrello, dissenting), the Court of Appeals reversed the trial court’s denial of Defendant Beverly Young’s motion for summary disposition, in which Young sought dismissal of Plaintiff Kevin Davis’s third-party action against her. The Court of Appeals held that Davis failed to satisfy the first and third prongs of the test for establishing a serious impairment of body function set forth in McCormick v Carrier, 487 Mich 180, and that Davis failed to show that any of his injuries were caused by the subject motor vehicle collision.

Loiola v Citizens Ins Co of America, et al (COA – UNP 12/2/2021; RB #4359)
In this unanimous unpublished per curiam decision, the Court of Appeals—on remand from the Supreme Court—affirmed its prior order vacating a judgment entered in favor of Plaintiff Russell Loiola in Loiola’s first-party action against Defendant Citizens Insurance Company of America (“Citizens”) and ordering a new trial for various reasons. The Supreme Court vacated part of the Court of Appeals’ prior order—in which the Court of Appeals held that Citizens was not required to plead fraud as an affirmative defense with particularity—and remanded to the Court of Appeals for reconsideration of that part of its order in light of a separate panel’s holding in Glasker-Davis v Auvenshire, 333 Mich App 222 (2020). In Glasker-Davis, the Court of Appeals held that a no-fault insurer raising fraud as an affirmative defense must do so with particularity, and thus, in revisiting that issue on remand, the Court of Appeals held that Citizens failed to raise fraud as an affirmative defense with particularity, but that it must be granted leave to amend its affirmative defenses.

Jones, et al v State Farm Mut Auto Ins Co, et al (COA – UNP 11/23/2021; RB #4354)
In this unanimous unpublished per curiam decision, the Court of Appeals affirmed the trial court’s summary disposition order dismissing Intervenor-Plaintiff EQMD, Inc.’s (“EQMD”) first-party action against State Farm Mutual Automobile Insurance Company (“State Farm”). The Court of Appeals held that EQMD, a “pharmacy management organization,” qualified as a pharmaceutical “manufacturer” and/or “wholesale distributor,” requiring licensure, under the Public Health Code, and, because EQMD was not so licensed, its services were not lawfully rendered and therefore not compensable under the no-fault act. The Court of Appeals held, alternatively, that EQMD’s services as a “pharmacy management organization” were not reasonably necessary products, services, or accommodations for the care, recovery, or rehabilitation of injured persons, and therefore not compensable under the no-fault act.

Meemic Ins Co v Estate of Pearce, et al (COA – UNP 11/23/2021; RB #4352)
In this unanimous unpublished per curiam decision, the Court of Appeals reversed the trial court’s summary disposition order dismissing Plaintiff Meemic Insurance Company’s (“Meemic”) action for declaratory relief, in which it sought a declaration that Patricia Musser’s no-fault insurance policy was void because of Musser’s alleged post-procurement fraud regarding which individuals would be operating vehicles covered under the policy. The Court of Appeals held, first, that the trial court erred in ruling that Meemic could only rescind the policy if it could show that Musser committed fraud in procuring the policy. Meemic could also rescind the policy if Musser committed post-procurement fraud which amounted to a substantial breach of contract. Since a question of fact existed as to whether Musser’s alleged fraud did amount to such, the Court of Appeals remanded the case back to the trial court. Secondly, the Court of Appeals held that Meemic did not waive its ability to rescind the policy by notifying Musser that it was cancelling her policy after filing the underlying action for declaratory relief.

Sabbar, et al v State Farm Mut Auto Ins Co (COA – UNP 11/23/2021; RB #4357)
In this unanimous unpublished per curiam decision, the Court of Appeals affirmed the trial court’s summary disposition order denying EQMD, Inc.’s (“EQMD”) motion to intervene in Plaintiff Rafael Sabbar’s first-party action against Defendant State Farm Mutual Automobile Insurance Company (“State Farm”). The Court of Appeals held that EQMD, a “nationwide provider of pharmaceutical dispensing solutions for physicians,” did not have an interest in Sabbar’s claim for unpaid no-fault PIP benefits and was therefore not entitled to intervene in his suit against State Farm.

Skwierc, et al v Whisnant, et al (COA – PUB 11/23/2021; RB #4350)
In this unanimous published decision authored by Justice Borrello (Boonstra, concurring), the Court of Appeals reversed the trial court’s summary disposition order dismissing Plaintiff Michigan Head & Spine Institute’s (“MHSI”) first-party action against Defendant Meemic Insurance Company (“Meemic”). The Court of Appeals held that MHSI was entitled to reimbursement under the no-fault act for an MRI it performed on Meemic’s insured’s lumbar spine, even though the MRI was ordered by a chiropractor. In so holding, the Court of Appeals concluded that the MRI at issue fell within the definition of “practice of chiropractic” as that phrase was defined in MCL 333.16401 as of January 1, 2009, and that, as a result, the MRI qualified as an allowable expense under MCL 500.3107b(b).

Spectrum Health Hosps, et al v Esurance Prop and Cas Ins Co, et al (COA – UNP 11/23/2021; RB #4351)
In this unanimous unpublished per curiam decision, the Court of Appeals reversed the trial court’s summary disposition order in favor of Plaintiff Spectrum Health Hospitals (“Spectrum”) in Spectrum’s first-party action against Defendant Esurance Property and Casualty Insurance Company (“Esurance”). The Court of Appeals held that reasonable minds could differ as to whether Spectrum’s patient/Esurance’s insured, Kevin Shea Lindsey, intended to injure himself when he jumped from a moving vehicle at approximately 30-40 mph, such that he would be barred from no-fault PIP benefits under MCL 500.3105.

Tedder, et al v Geico Indemnity Co, et al (COA – UNP 11/23/2021; RB #4356)
In this unanimous unpublished per curiam decision, the Court of Appeals affirmed the trial court’s summary disposition order dismissing Plaintiff Kym Tedder’s first-party action against Defendant Geico Indemnity Company (“Geico”). The Court of Appeals held that Tedder lacked standing to bring her claim for unpaid no-fault PIP benefits because the bankruptcy trustee in her separate, pending bankruptcy action was the real party in interest. Central to the Court’s holding was Tedder’s inability/failure to exempt her first-party claims from her bankruptcy estate.

Titus v Auto-Owners Ins Co, et al (COA – UNP 11/23/2021; RB #4353)
In this unanimous unpublished per curiam decision, the Court of Appeals affirmed the trial court’s summary disposition order dismissing Plaintiff Marylynn Titus’s third-party action against Defendant Mikes Cars, LLC (“Mikes Cars”). At issue in this case was whether Mikes Cars effectively transferred title of a vehicle it sold to Ronald Benfield II, who crashed into Titus immediately upon leaving Mikes Cars’ lot in said vehicle. The Court of Appeals held that title did transfer to Benfield prior to the crash, and that summary disposition, therefore, was properly granted in Mikes Cars’ favor as to Titus’s claims against it under Michigan’s owner’s liability statute. The Court observed that MCL 257.233(9) establishes the operative date for determining when a vehicle’s title is transferred as the date of signature on either the application for title or on the assignment of the certificate of title. In this case, there was no dispute that the application for title was signed prior to the motor vehicle crash.

Vanzandt v Peaks, et al (COA – UNP 11/23/2021; RB #4355)
In this unanimous unpublished per curiam decision, the Court of Appeals affirmed the trial court’s summary disposition order dismissing Plaintiff Janice Vanzandt’s third-party action against Defendants Brandon Tyrell Peaks and Rock-Way, LLC (“Rock-Way”). The Court of Appeals held that Vanzandt’s action was barred by judicial estoppel because Vanzandt failed to notify the bankrupty court in a separate, pending Chapter 13 bankruptcy action of her potential claim against the defendants.

Hines, et al v Mich Auto Ins Placement Facility, et al (COA – UNP 11/18/2021; RB #4344)
In this unanimous unpublished per curiam decision, the Court of Appeals reversed the trial court’s summary disposition order dismissing Plaintiff Michelle Hines’s first-party action against the Michigan Automobile Insurance Placement Facility (“MAIPF”). The Court of Appeals held that a question of fact existed as to whether Hines had permission to take the vehicle she was driving at the time of the subject crash, and whether, therefore, she was eligible for no-fault PIP benefits through the MAIPF.

Hmeidan, et al v State Farm Mut Auto Ins Co, et al (COA – UNP 11/18/2021; RB #4343)
In this unanimous unpublished per curiam decision, the Court of Appeals reversed the trial court’s summary disposition order dismissing Plaintiff Malek Hmeidan’s first-party action against Defendants State Farm Mutual Automobile Insurance Company (“State Farm”) and Progressive Michigan Insurance Company (“Progressive”). The Court of Appeals held, first, that the trial court erred in granting summary disposition to Progressive, because a question of fact existed as to whether the equities weighed in favor of rescission of Hmeidan’s mother’s automobile insurance policy with respect to Hmeidan, an innocent third party, because of misrepresentations his mother made in procuring the policy. The Court of Appeals held, second, that the former MCL 500.3113(a)—in effect at the time of the subject motorcycle crash on September 1, 2012—applied to this case, not the version which was amended by 2014 PA 489, because the amended version did not apply retroactively. The Court of Appeals held, third, that a question of fact existed as to whether Hmeidan knew that the motorcycle he was driving at the time of the subject crash had been stolen, and therefore, that a question of fact existed as to whether Hmeidan’s use of the motorcycle constituted an “unlawful taking” for purposes of MCL 500.3113(a). Lastly, the Court of Appeals held that the fact that Hmeidan did not have the requisite motorcycle endorsement on his driver’s license also did not render his taking of the motorcycle “unlawful” for purposes of MCL 500.3113(a).

James River Ins Co v Citizens Ins Co of America (COA – UNP 11/18/2021; RB #4348)
Defendant Citizens Insurance Company of America (“Citizens”) in its dispute with Plaintiff James River Insurance Company (“James River”) over which insurer had priority responsibility for payment of Joseph Bolton’s underinsured motorist benefits. The Court of Appeals held that Citizens’ homeowners’ policy was a “true” excess insurance policy, in that it only extended coverage once all other applicable insurance coverage had been exhausted, whereas the James River policy was an excess “other insurance” policy, in that it offered excess coverage when triggered by certain circumstances—e.g. a motor vehicle collision caused by an underinsured driver. Relying on Supreme Court precedent in Bosco v Bauermeister, 456 Mich 279 (1997), the Court of Appeals held that excess “other insurance” policies are primary over “true” excess insurance policies, and thus the James River policy was primary in this case.

Razouky v Doaks, et al COA – (UNP 11/18/2021; RB #4346)
In this unanimous unpublished per curiam decision, the Court of Appeals reversed the trial court’s denial of Defendant Diondre Marcus Doaks’s motion for summary disposition, in which Doaks sought dismissal of Plaintiff George Razouky’s third-party action against him. The Court of Appeals held that Razouky failed to allege facts sufficient to create a question of fact as to whether Doaks, a police officer acting in the course and scope of his employment at the time of the subject collision, was grossly negligent in causing the subject collision. Notably, the Court of Appeals made it clear that its decision was limited to the gross negligence count of Plaintiff’s complaint and that the other counts contained therein were not at issue on appeal.

Willis v Mich Auto Ins Placement Facility (COA – UNP 11/18/2021; RB #4345)
In this unanimous unpublished per curiam decision, the Court of Appeals reversed the trial court’s summary disposition order dismissing Plaintiff Kimberly Willis’s first-party action against Defendant Michigan Automobile Insurance Placement Facility (“MAIPF”). The Court of Appeals held that a question of fact existed as to whether Willis was an out-of-state resident at the time of the subject collision and whether, therefore, she was barred from receiving no-fault PIP benefits pursuant to MCL 500.3113(c).

Winfield v State Auto Prop and Cas Ins Co, et al (COA – UNP 11/18/2021; RB #4349)
In this unanimous unpublished per curiam decision, the Court of Appeals reversed the trial court’s partial summary disposition order dismissing some of Plaintiff Larcheri Winfield’s first-party claims against Defendant State Auto Property and Casualty Insurance Company (“State Auto”). The Court of Appeals held that, because Winfield assigned her right to pursue certain no-fault PIP benefits to various medical providers, and because there was no indication that Winfield retained any power to revoke the assignments, Winfield could not pursue the assigned claims in her own, separate first-party action against State Auto, because she was no longer the real party in interest with respect to those claims.

Zavala v Mich Auto Ins Placement Facility, et al (COA – UNP 11/18/2021; RB #4346)
In this unanimous unpublished per curiam decision, the Court of Appeals reversed the trial court’s summary disposition order dismissing Plaintiff Arturo Zavala’s first-party claim against Defendant Trinity Cab Company (“Trinity”), but affirmed the trial court’s summary disposition order dismissing Plaintiff Valerie Zavala’s third-party claim against Trinity. As to Arturo’s claim, the Court of Appeals held that a question of fact existed as to whether his aggravation of a pre-existing eye injury was “causally connected” to the subject incident such that he would be entitled to no-fault PIP benefits pursuant to MCL 500.3105(1). As to Valerie’s claim, the Court of Appeals held that she failed to present sufficient evidence to create a question of fact as to whether her knee injuries were objectively manifested for purposes of the test for serious impairment of body function set forth in McCormick v Carrier, 487 Mich 180 (2010), and that her chipped tooth did not constitute a permanent serious disfigurement.

Enhance Center for Interventional Spine & Sports v Auto-Owners Ins Co, et al (COA – UNP 11/9/2021; RB #4338)
In this unanimous unpublished per curiam decision, the Court of Appeals reversed the trial court’s summary disposition order dismissing Plaintiff Enhance Center for Interventional Spine & Sports’ (“Enhance”) first-party action against Defendant Auto-Owners Insurance Company (“Auto-Owners”) on the basis of res judicata. The Court of Appeals held that, because Enhance obtained an assignment from its patient/Auto-Owners’ insured, Kelly Johnson, before Johnson’s separate first-party action against Auto-Owners was dismissed, Enhance’s subsequent first-party action was not barred by res judicata.

Estate of Reid, et al v Council, et al (COA – UNP 11/9/2021; RB #4340)
In this unanimous unpublished per curiam decision, the Court of Appeals reversed the trial court’s denial of Defendant State Farm Mutual Automobile Insurance Company’s (“State Farm”) motion for summary disposition in which State Farm sought dismissal of Plaintiff Estate of Nicole Yvette Reid’s (“Plaintiff”) first-party action against it. Reid had a policy of no-fault insurance through State Farm Mutual Automobile Insurance Company (“State Farm”), under which she coordinated her medical coverage with her health insurer, Blue Care Network (“BCN”). After Reid was injured in a car crash, she sought medical treatment from providers that were not in her health insurer’s network, so her providers requested payment for the treatment they rendered from State Farm. The Court of Appeals held, however, that, based on MCL 500.3109a, the no-fault insurer of an individual with coordinated no-fault and health insurance coverage who chooses to receive treatment from a provider outside her health insurer’s network is not required to pay for that treatment unless similar treatments were not available from any provider within the health insurer’s network. In this case, Reid never alleged that similar services were not available from a provider within her health insurer’s network, and thus State Farm was not required to pay for her treatment.

Grady, et al v Wambach, et al (COA – PUB 11/9/2021; RB #4342)
In this 2-1 published decision authored by Justice Cameron (Sawyer, dissenting), the Court of Appeals reversed the trial court’s summary disposition order dismissing Plaintiff Mercyland Health Services, PLLC’s (“Mercyland”) first-party action against Defendant Meemic Insurance Company (“Meemic”). Meemic argued that, because Mercyland’s owner and sole practitioner, Dr. Mohammad Abraham, was not licensed to practice medicine in Michigan, Mercyland violated the Michigan Limited Liability Company Act (MLLCA), which requires that all member of a PLLC be licensed to render the same professional services as the corporate entity. Furthermore, Meemic argued, because Mercyland violated the MLLCA, the treatments Dr. Abraham rendered to its patient/Meemic’s insured were not “lawfully rendered” for purposes the no-fault act. The Court of Appeals held that Meemic did not have standing to challenge Mercyland’s corporate status under the MLLCA, and that, as a result, it would not be proper for the Court to reach the issue of whether Mercyland’s alleged violation of the MLLCA rendered the treatment it provided unlawful under the no-fault act. This was especially so because Meemic presented no other argument regarding the lawfulness of the treatments rendered other than that examining Mercyland’s corporate form.

Mathis v Auto Owners, et al (COA – PUB 11/9/2021; RB #4339)
In this unanimous published per curiam decision, the Court of Appeals affirmed the trial court’s order granting Defendant Michigan Property & Casualty Guaranty Association’s (“MPCGA”) motion for summary disposition. Plaintiff Gary Mathis was injured as he alighted from his parked semi-truck in the course and scope of his employment and began receiving worker’s compensation benefits from Guaranty Insurance. At some point thereafter, Guaranty Insurance became insolvent, and the MPCGA assumed responsibility for Mathis’s claim. The MPCGA refused to pay Mathis further benefits under his former policy with Guaranty, however, arguing that, pursuant to the Property and Casualty Guaranty Association Act (“the Guaranty Act”), MCL 500.7901, et seq, upon Guaranty Insurance’s insolvency, Mathis had to first exhaust all benefits available from any other applicable insurer—i.e. Home-Owners Insurance Company (“Home-Owners”), the insurer of Mathis’s employer’s truck—before turning to the MPCGA. The Court of Appeals agreed with the MPCGA’s argument, and held that, since Home-Owners was an applicable insurer, Mathis would have to first exhaust all available benefits under the Home-Owners’ policy before the MPCGA would become obligated to resume payment of the benefits Mathis had been receiving under the Guaranty Insurance policy. Notably, in determining that Mathis was entitled to no-fault PIP benefits from Home-Owners for this accident, the Court of Appeals concluded that Mathis was not precluded from recovering PIP benefits under MCL 500.3106(2)(a), because that statutory subsection was created to prevent injured persons from obtaining a double recovery under both the no-fault act and the worker’s compensation disability act.

Mich Head & Spine Institute v Frankenmuth Mut Ins Co (COA – UNP 11/4/2021; RB #4337)
In this unanimous unpublished per curiam decision, the Court of Appeals reversed the trial court’s summary disposition order dismissing Plaintiff Michigan Head & Spine Institute’s (“Michigan Head & Spine”) first-party action against Defendant Frankenmuth Mutual Insurance Company (“Frankenmuth Mutual”). Relying on its prior decision in Mich Head & Spine Institute PC v Auto-Owners Ins Co, ___ Mich App ___ (2021), the Court of Appeals held that Michigan Head & Spine could aggregate 24 unrelated claims for unpaid no-fault PIP benefits against Frankenmuth Mutual in order to meet the jurisdictional threshold of $25,000 for Michigan circuit courts.

Michigan Spine and Brain Surgeons, PLLC v Esurance Prop and Cas Ins Co (UNP – COA 10/28/2021; RB #4334)
In this 2-1 per curiam decision (Shapiro concurring, O’Brien dissenting), the Court of Appeals reversed the trial court’s summary disposition order dismissing Plaintiff Michigan Spine and Brain Surgeons, PLLC’s (“Michigan Spine”) first-party action against Defendant Esurance Property and Casualty Insurance Company (“Esurance”) on the basis of res judicata. The Court of Appeals held that the moment Michigan Spine obtained an assignment from its patient/Esurance’s insured, Felicia Jones, it was no longer in privity with Jones, and thus a subsequent judgment against Jones in a separate first-party action between her and Esurance would not bar Michigan Spine’s action on the basis of res judicata.

Mosley v Senters (UNP – COA 10/28/2021; RB #4333)
In this unanimous unpublished per curiam decision, the Court of Appeals reversed the trial court’s decision to not award 500.3148 attorney fees to Plaintiff Emmanuel Mosley following a jury trial in his first-party action against Defendant Integon National Insurance Company (“Integon”), but affirmed the trial court’s award of case evaluation sanctions against Mosley. Even though Mosley prevailed on only a fraction of his claim for unpaid no-fault PIP benefits at trial, the Court of Appeals held that he was still entitled to attorney fees under MCL 500.3148 for the portion of the claim he did prevail on. With respect to the trial court’s award of case evaluation sanctions, the Court of Appeals held that the trial court did not err in awarding said sanctions even though Integon paid a $61,000 Medicare lien the day before trial, which Mosley argued unfairly reduced the amount of damages he could be awarded and effectively “ensured that [Integon] would be awarded case evaluation sanctions.” While the Court of Appeals acknowledged an appeal to Mosley’s argument, it noted that this was not the case to consider the utility of imposing a rule to prevent insurers from such legal maneuvering, because the Medicaid lien amount was not actually submitted to the case evaluation panel, nor was it included in the case evaluation panel’s award.

LeBlanc v Washtenaw Co Rd Comm (UNP – COA 10/28/2021; RB #4332)
In this unanimous unpublished per curiam decision, the Court of Appeals reversed the trial court’s summary disposition order dismissing Plaintiff Christopher LeBlanc’s third-party action against Defendant Washtenaw County Road Commission. On remand from the Supreme Court and per the Supreme Court’s instruction, the Court of Appeals held that the 120-day notice period set forth in the Governmental Tort Liability Act (“GTLA”), MCL 691.1401 et seq—not the 60-day notice period set forth in the County Road Law, MCL 224.1, et seq—applies to negligence actions against county road commissioners.

Rugg v Divina, et al (UNP – COA 10/21/2021; RB #4331)
In this unanimous unpublished per curiam decision, the Court of Appeals affirmed the trial court’s summary disposition order dismissing Plaintiff Delphine Rugg’s third-party action against Defendants Delfin Divina and Divina Divina. Rugg alleged that she suffered two injuries as a result of the subject car crash: a torn rotator cuff and cervicalgia. As for her torn rotator cuff, the Court of Appeals held that Rugg failed to present sufficient evidence to create a question of fact as to whether that injury was caused by the subject crash, and as for her cervicalgia, the Court held that that injury did not affect her general ability to lead her normal life, and thus did not satisfy the third prong of the test set forth in McCormick v Carrier, 487 Mich 180 (2008) for serious impairment of body function.

Auto Club Group Ins Co v Gov’t Employees Ins Co (UNP – COA 10/21/2021; RB #4330)
In this unanimous unpublished per curiam decision, the Court of Appeals affirmed the trial court’s summary disposition order in favor of Plaintiff Auto Club Group Insurance Company (“Auto Club”) in Auto Club’s priority dispute with Defendant Government Employees Insurance Company’s (“GEICO”). The Court of Appeals held that GEICO, a certified insurer under the former MCL 500.3163, was first in priority for payment of out-of-state resident Donald Ray Layman’s PIP benefits, despite the fact that Layman’s California auto insurance policy issued by GEICO contained a clause which would otherwise have excluded him from coverage for the subject car crash. In reaching its holding, the Court of Appeals relied on its prior decision in Transp Ins Co v Home Ins Co, 134 Mich App 645 (1984), in which it held “that, when an insurance company has filed a certification under [the former] MCL 500.3163, the insurance company cannot rely on policy exclusions to avoid its obligation to pay its out-of-state insured’s benefits.”

Citizens Ins Co of America v Likely (UNP – COA 10/21/2021; RB #4329) 
In this unanimous unpublished per curiam decision, the Court of Appeals affirmed the trial court’s summary disposition order dismissing Defendant Citizens Insurance Company of America’s (“Citizens”) declaratory judgment action against Plaintiff Carl Likely.  Likely was injured in a motor vehicle collision in 2002 and filed five separate lawsuits over the course of the next 18 yearsseeking unpaid no-fault PIP benefits from Citizens.  In 2020, Citizens filed the underlying action—in an admitted attempt to avoid future litigation—seeking a declaratory judgment that Likely had fully recovered from the injuries he sustained in the 2002 crash.  The Court of Appeals held that Citizens’ complaint was insufficient in that it contained only conclusory and unsupported allegations regarding Likely’s condition and failed to state a claim for which relief could be granted.  Moreover, the Court of Appeals held that the trial court did not err in denying Citizens’ motion to amend its complaint because its claim was not ripeit “rest[ed] on hypothetical and contingent future events—[Likely’s] potential need for benefits—which may not occur.”  In other words, Citizens could not file a declaratory action to prohibit Likely from hypothetically claiming PIP benefits for future treatments that were not even contemplated as of the date of filing.

Fortman v Schneider, et al (UNP – COA 10/21/2021; RB #4328)
In this unanimous unpublished per curiam decision, the Court of Appeals reversed the trial court’s summary disposition order dismissing Plantiff Laura Fortman’s third-party action against Defendants Dusty Dean Schneider and Duaine Morin. The Court of Appeals held that the trial court erred in ruling that the underlying action was barred by judicial estoppel in light of comments Fortman made about her injuries in a prior first-party action, which Schneider and Morin argued were at odds with her claims about her injuries in this case. In so holding, the Court observed that (1)there was no evidence that the court presiding over the prior first-party action relied on Fortman’s allegedly contrary position, (2) Fortman’s claims in the prior first-party action action were not wholly inconsistent with her claims in this case, nor was there any indication that any alleged changing of her position the product of cynical gamesmanship or deliberate manipulation of the courts, and (3) application of the doctrine was not necessary to avoid a miscarriage of justice. Thus, the doctrine did not apply.

Atkinson v Kreilter, et al (UNP – COA 10/21/2021; RB #4327)
In this unanimous unpublished per curiam decision, the Court of Appeals affirmed judgments entered by the trial court in favor of Plaintiffs Brook Atkinson, Michael Falecki, and the Estate of Carolyn Manes in their third-party action to recover underinsured motorist (“UIM”) benefits from Defendant American Alternative Insurance Corporation (“AAIC”) following a jury trial. The Court of Appeals reached multiple holdings in its opinion: first, the Court held that AAIC, in its motion for judgment notwithstanding the verdict (“JNOV”), could not argue that the plaintiffs failed to establish, foundationally, that AAIC was contractually liable for paying UIM benefits to them because AAIC conceded as much during trial. Second, the Court held that, given the specific language of the subject AAIC policy, the sum of any damages found by the jury, plus case evaluation sanctions and penalty interest, could exceed the limits of UIM coverage available under the subject policy. Third, the Court of Appeals held that, given the evidence in this case, the trial court did not err in ruling, as a matter of law, that the sudden emergency doctrine was not applicable. Fourth, the Court held that the trial court did not err in awarding penalty interest against AAIC under the UTPA—dating back to the filing date of each plaintiff’s complaint—because AAIC failed to explain to the plaintiffs what constituted “satisfactory proof of loss” for purposes of entitlement to UIM benefits under the policy prior to the filing of each lawsuit. The UTPA—MCL 500.2006(3), specifically—“places the onus on an insurer to provide the insured with an explanation of what is necessary to constitute a satisfactory proof of loss.” Since AAIC failed to do so, “any failure by plaintiffs to prove a satisfactory proof of loss was excused” and penalty interest under the UTPA began to accrue on the filing date of each complaint. However, the plaintiffs were not entitled to both statutory prejudgment interest and UTPA penalty interest that were duplicative of one another, and thus the Court of Appeals remanded for modification of the plaintiffs’ judgments.

Munson Med Ctr, et al v Falls Lake Nat’l Ins Co (UNP – COA 10/14/2021; RB #4326) 
In this unanimous unpublished per curiam decision, the Court of Appeals affirmed the trial court’s summary disposition order dismissing Plaintiffs Munson Medical Center and Munson Healthcare Otsego Memorial Hospital’s (“Munson,” collectively) first-party action against Defendant Falls Lake National Insurance Company (“Falls Lake”).  The Court of Appeals held that Falls Lake was entitled to rescind the policy of Dawn Drum, its insured/Munson’s patient, because Drum made a material misrepresentation on her original application for automobile insurance.

Estate of Kostich v Monroe Motorsports, Inc Ins Co, et al (UNP – COA 5/27/2021; RB #4325)
In this unanimous unpublished per curiam decision, the Court of Appeals affirmed the trial court’s denial of Defendant Estate of Kord Kostich’s motion seeking to preclude Defendant Monroe Motorsports, Inc.’s (“Monroe Motorsports”) accident reconstructionist expert witness, Steven Fenton, from offering his opinion as to how the subject crash involving a Polaris Slingshot auto-cycle occurred. The Court of Appeals held that Fenton was sufficiently qualified to offer expert testimony about traction control and how it played a factor in the subject crash, and that Fenton relied on sufficient facts and data in forming his opinion.

McKinnie, et al v State Farm Mut Auto Ins Co (COA – UNP 10/14/2021; RB #4324)
In this unanimous unpublished per curiam decision, the Court of Appeals affirmed the trial court’s denial of Defendant State Farm Mutual Automobile Insurance Company’s (“State Farm”) motion for summary disposition, in which State Farm sought dismissal of Plaintiffs Kelly McKinnie and Dejanae McKinnie’s first-party action to recover no-fault PIP benefits. The Court of Appeals held that a question of fact existed as to whether Kelly and Dejanae McKinnie were entitled to no-fault PIP benefits under the former MCL 500.3163, because a question of fact existed as to whether Dennis McKinnie, an out-of-state resident, was a constructive owner of the motor vehicle Kelly and Dejanae were traveling in at the time of the subject crash.

Hensley v Auto Club Group Ins Co, et al (COA – UNP 10/14/2021; RB #4323)
In this unanimous unpublished per curiam decision (Swartzle, concurring), the Court of Appeals affirmed the trial court’s summary disposition order dismissing Plaintiff Dana Hensley’s third-party action for uninsured motorist benefits against Defendant Auto Club Group Insurance Company (“Auto Club”). The Court of Appeals held that Hensley failed to comply with a provision in his policy with Auto Club which required that he file a written report of any hit-and-run collision to law enforcement within 24-hours of the collision’s occurrence in order to proceed with a claim for UM benefits under the policy.

Collier v Montalvo, et al (COA – UNP 9/23/2021; RB #4321)
In this unanimous unpublished per curiam decision, the Court of Appeals affirmed a judgment of no cause of action entered after a jury trial in Plaintiff Vicki Collier’s third-party action against Defendant Lindsay Montalvo. The Court of Appeals held that the trial court did not err in denying Collier’s motion for a directed verdict and JNOV because, given Collier’s and Montalvo’s conflicting accounts of how the crash happened, there was a question of fact as to whether Montalvo was operating her vehicle negligently at the time of the crash.

Auto Club Ins Assoc/MemberSelect Ins Co v Farm Bureau General Ins Co of Mich, et al (COA – UNP 9/23/2021; RB #4321)
In this unanimous unpublished per curiam decision, the Court of Appeals reversed the trial court’s summary disposition order, in which the trial court dismissed Plaintiff Auto Club Insurance Association/MemberSelect Insurance Company’s (“Auto Club”) action against Defendant Farm Bureau General Insurance Company of Michigan (“Farm Bureau”) arising out of a priority dispute.  The Court of Appeals held that Auto Club and Farm Bureau were equal in priority for payment of Sabreen Shamoon’s no-fault PIP benefits, and that Auto Club was therefore entitled to partial recoupment of the benefits it paid to Shamoon pursuant to MCL 500.3115(2).  Furthermore, the Court of Appeals held that actions for partial recoupment under MCL 500.3115(2) are not subject to the one-year-back rule as are subrogation actions, but are rather subject to the six-year limitations period set forth in MCL 600.5813.

Downs, et al v State Farm Mutual Automobile Insurance Company, et al (COA – UNP 9/23/2021; RB #4320)     
In this unanimous unpublished per curiam decision, the Court of Appeals reversed the trial court’s denial of Defendant State Farm Mutual Automobile Insurance Company’s (“State Farm”) motion for summary disposition seeking dismissal of Intervenor-Plaintiffs Renaissace Chirporactic, PC (“Renaissance”), Centrium Physical Therapy PC (“Centrium”), and Core Healing Body Works, LLC’s (“Core Healing”) action against it, in which the intervenor-plaintiffs sought reimbursement for the treatments they provided to State Farm’s insured, Erika Tyler, after Tyler was injured in a motor vehicle collision.  The intervenor-plaintiffs sought reimbursement under a theory of unjust enrichment, but the Court of Appeals held that their lawsuit was merely a first-party action governed by the no-fault act, and that they could not invoke the doctrine of unjust enrichment in order to obtain unpaid PIP benefits from State Farm. 

Yang v Everest Nat’l Ins Co, et al (MSC – PUB; 06/10/2021; RB #4319) 
In this unanimous opinion by Justice Bernstein, the Supreme Court held that “under MCL 500.3020(1)(b), a cancellation notice is effective only if it is peremptory, explicit, and unconditional. The Court then concluded that a cancellation letter by Everest National was ineffective “because Everest’s letter provided that cancellation was conditioned upon Yang’s failure to pay his insurance premiums.

Estate of Ballentine v Salvaggio, et al (COA – UNP 9/16/2021; RB #4318)   
In this unanimous unpublished per curiam decision, the Court of Appeals affirmed the trial court’s summary disposition order dismissing Plaintiff Estate of Mark Ballentine’s third-party lawsuit against Defendants Robert Salvaggio, National Mini Storage-KL Avenue, and U-Haul Company of Michigan (“Salvaggio,” “National,” and “U-Haul, individually; “defendants,” collectively).  Salvaggio, an employee of National, arrived to work and attempted to park a U-Haul vehicle that had been left outside the gate to the parking lot.  In the process, he accidentally ran over Ballentine, who was intoxicated and laying underneath the vehicle.  The Court of Appeals held that Salvaggio did not breach his duty to exercise ordinary care in his operation of the U-Haul by not looking underneath the vehicle before moving it.

Eagle, et al v Macomb Intermediate School Dist, et al (COA – UNP 9/2/2021; RB #4317)   
In this unanimous unpublished per curiam decision, the Court of Appeals affirmed in part and reversed in part the trial court’s summary disposition order dismissing Plaintiff William Eagle’s third-party action against Defendant Macomb Intermediate School District (“MISD”).  The Court of Appeals held that the motor vehicle exception to governmental immunity applied to this case because Eagle presented sufficient evidence to create a question of fact as to whether he suffered a shoulder injury in the subject school bus versus motor vehicle crash caused by the negligence of MISD’s bus driver.  The Court also held, however, that Eagle failed to present sufficient evidence to create a question of fact as to whether he suffered a brain injury in the crash.

Smith, et al v City of Detroit, et al (COA – UNP 9/2/2021; RB #4316)
In this unanimous unpublished per curiam decision, the Court of Appeals reversed the trial court’s summary disposition order dismissing Plaintiff Jeanine D. Smith’s first-party action against Defendant City of Detroit, as well as Smith’s third-party action against Defendants Elliott Baum and Natalie Baum. Regarding Smith’s first-party action against the City of Detroit, the Court of Appeals held that Smith presented sufficient evidence to create a question of fact as to whether she suffered an accidental bodily injury in the subject crash for purposes of no-fault PIP benefit entitlement under MCL 500.3105(1). Regarding Smith’s third-party action against the Baums, the Court of Appeals held that Smith presented sufficient evidence to create a question of fact as to whether the subject crash caused her to suffer a serious impairment of body function.

Toduti, et al v Progressive Mich Ins Co, et al (UNP– COA 9/2/2021; RB #4315)
In this unanimous unpublished per curiam decision, the Court of Appeals affirmed the trial court’s summary disposition order in favor of Defendant Progressive Michigan Insurance Company (“Progressive”), in which the trial court ruled that Defendant Cherokee Insurance Company (“Cherokee”) was the highest priority insurer with respect to Plaintiff Florin Toduti’s claim for no-fault PIP benefits. The Court of Appeals held that, based on the “economic reality test,” Toduti was actually an employee, not an independent contractor, of Universal, Mason & Dixon Intermodal (“Universal), the company which leased and insured the semi-truck Toduti owned and was driving in the course and scope of his duties under his contract with Universal at the time of the subject collision. The Court of Appeals further held that, because of the terms of its long-term lease agreement regarding the truck, Universal was an “owner” of the semi-truck pursuant to MCL 500.3101(2)(h), and, therefore, under MCL 500.3114(3), Univeral’s insurer, Cherokee, was the highest priority insurer for Toduti’s claims for benefits.

Mich Head & Spine Institute v Auto-Owners Ins Co, et al (PUB– COA 9/2/2021; RB #4314)
In this majority published decision authored by Justice Kelly (Riordan, dissenting), the Court of Appeals reversed the trial court’s summary disposition order dismissing Plaintiff Michigan Head & Spine Institute PC’s (“Michigan Head & Spine”) first-party action against Defendants Auto-Owners Insurance Company and Home-Owners Insurance Company (“defendants,” collectively). The Court of Appeals held that Michigan Head & Spine could aggregate 39 unrelated claims for unpaid no-fault PIP benefits in order to meet the jurisdictional threshold of $25,000 for Michigan circuit courts.

Bronson Health Care Group, Inc, et al v State Farm Fire and Cas Co, et al (UNP – COA 8/26/2021; RB #4313)
In this unanimous unpublished per curiam decision, the Court of Appeals reversed the trial court’s summary disposition order dismissing Plaintiff Bronson Health Care Group, Inc.’s (“Bronson”) first-party action against Defendant State Farm Fire and Casualty Company (“State Farm”). The Court of Appeals held that a question of fact existed as to whether State Farm complied with MCL 500.3020(1)(b) in cancelling its insured’s—Bronson’s patient’s—automobile insurance policy, under which Bronson sought no-fault PIP benefits on the basis of an assignment. Specifically, the Court of Appeals held that a question of fact existed as to whether State Farm mailed written notice of cancellation to the insured’s address last known to it.

Estate of Johnson v Progressive Marathon Ins Co (UNP – COA 8/26/2021; RB #4312)
In this unanimous unpublished per curiam decision, the Court of Appeals affirmed the trial court’s denial of Defendant Progressive Marathon Insurance Company’s (“Progressive”) motion for summary disposition, in which Progressive sought dismissal of Plaintiff Estate of Derell Darnell Johnson’s (“the Estate”) first-party action against it. The Court of Appeals held that Progressive failed to conclusively prove that its insureds, Tomeka Roche Lewis and Brandon Lawrence Byers—under whose policy the Estate sought PIP benefits after Johnson was killed in the subject motor vehicle collision—committed fraud, thereby entitling State Farm to rescind their policy and deny the Estate’s claim for PIP benefits under it.

Nickerson v Allstate Ins Co (UNP – COA 8/26/2021; RB #4311)
In this unanimous unpublished per curiam decision, the Court of Appeals affirmed the trial court’s denial of Defendant Allstate Insurance Company’s (“Allstate”) motion for summary disposition, in which Allstate sought dismissal of Plaintiff Tracey Nickerson’s first-party action against it, as well as the trial court’s denial of Nickerson’s post-trial motion for attorney fees. In denying Allstate’s motion for summary disposition, the Court of Appeals held that a question of fact existed as to whether Nickerson had committed a fraudulent insurance act for purposes of MCL 500.3172, and whether, therefore, her claim for no-fault PIP benefits was barred in its entirety. In denying Nickerson’s post-trial motion for attorney fees, the Court of Appeals held that, based on the specific facts and circumstances of this case, Nickerson failed to file her motion within a “reasonable time.”

Chivis v Cass County Public Transit, et al (UNP – COA 8/26/2021; RB #4310)
In this unanimous unpublished per curiam decision, the Court of Appeals reversed the trial court’s summary disposition order dismissing Plaintiff Nadageki Chivis’s third-party action against Defendant Cass County Public Transit (“CCPT”). The Court of Appeals held that Chivis presented sufficient evidence to create a question of fact as to whether CCPT’s bus driver, Linetta Smith, was operating the subject CCPT bus negligently when she ran over Chivis in the road, and whether, therefore, the CCPT could be held liable under the motor vehicle exception to governmental immunity, MCL 691.1405.

Estate of Ousley v Phelps Towing, Inc (UNP – COA 8/26/2021; RB #4309)
In this unanimous unpublished per curiam decision, the Court of Appeals affirmed the trial court’s summary disposition order dismissing Plaintiff Estate of Oscar Ousley’s third-party action against Defendant Phelps Towing, Incorporated (“Phelps”). The Court of Appeals held that the Estate failed to present any evidence that Phelps’s tow truck driver acted negligently when he accidentally ran over the Estate’s decedent.

Humphrey v Home-Owners Ins Co (UNP – COA 8/19/2021; RB #4308)
In this unanimous unpublished per curiam decision, the Court of Appeals reversed the trial court’s summary disposition order dismissing Plaintiff Adaseny Humphrey’s first-party action against Defendant Home-Owners Insurance Company (“Home-Owners”) on the basis of fraudulent statements Humphrey made at her deposition. Relying on Haydaw v Farm Bureau Ins Co, 332 Mich App 719 (2020), the Court of Appeals held that Home-Owners could not deny Humphrey’s claim for no-fault PIP benefits under her mother’s policy based on false statements Humphrey made after litigation had begun. Notably, the Court of Appeals explained that it was reaching this holding even though, in this case, Home-Owners was relying on a common law fraud defense, as opposed to a fraud-exclusion defense like that which was at issue in Haydaw. In so explaining, the Court iterated “the basic principle—that statements made during litigation are not made with the intent that the insurer will rely upon them—applies equally to both fraud-based defenses.”

Balsamo v Corrigan Enterprises, Inc, et al (UNP – COA 8/19/2021; RB #4307)
In this unanimous unpublished per curiam decision, the Court of Appeals reversed the trial court’s denial of Defendants Corrigan Enterprises, Inc. (“Corrigan”) and Justin Prall’s motion for summary disposition, in which they argued that the no-fault act—MCL 500.3135, specifically—applied to Plaintiff Guiseppe Balsamo’s lawsuit, which arose out of an injury Balsamo sustained while unloading construction equipment from a trailer. The Court of Appeals held that Balsamo’s lawsuit was, in fact, a third-party tort case under MCL 500.3135(1), not a general negligence action.

Rokosz v Labean, et al (UNP – COA 8/19/2021; RB #4306)
In this unanimous unpublished per curiam decision, the Court of Appeals reversed the trial court’s summary disposition order dismissing Plaintiff Sheila Ann Rokosz third-party action against Defendants Derek Joseph Labean, Donald Labean, and Dawn Labean. The Court of Appeals held that Rokosz presented sufficient evidence to create a question of fact as to whether her injuries were caused by the subject collision and whether they constituted a serious impairment of body function pursuant to McCormick v Carrier, 487 Mich 180 (2010).

Lekli v Hudson Ins Co (UNP – COA 8/19/2021; RB #4305)
In this unanimous unpublished per curiam decision, the Court of Appeals affirmed the trial court’s summary disposition order dismissing Plaintiff Syrja Lekli’s first-party action against Hudson Insurance Company (“Hudson”). The Court of Appeals held that Lekli’s action was barred by MCL 500.3145(1) because she neither filed her action within one year of the subject collision nor properly notified Hudson of her injuries within one year of the collision.


Lansing car accident lawyer Stephen Sinas is the lead editor of the appellate case summaries published on this site regarding the Michigan auto insurance law. To learn more about how Stephen Sinas and how the Sinas Dramis Law Firm can help you if you have been injured in a Michigan auto accident, visit SinasDramis.com.

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