Welcome to the Michigan Auto No-Fault Law Digital Library

The Michigan No-Fault Act was adopted in 1973, and since then, there have been over 4000 Michigan appellate court opinions regarding the law. Sinas Dramis Law Firm has written case summaries regarding virtually all these opinions and continues to do so at the present time. The Michigan Auto No-Fault Law Digital Library is a compilation of all the case summaries from Sinas Dramis Law Firm. The case summaries are freely provided to further our goal of educating the public about the Michigan Auto No-Fault Law.

The Digital Library is fully searchable. Therefore, searching by case name or relevant terms is a good way to find the case summary and opinion. There is also an indexing system that allows you to find a case through a statutory index, topical index, alphabetical index, or chronological index.

---

To make it easy for the public to understand the latest developments in the law, the recent case summaries are listed below.

C-Spine Orthopedics, PLLC v Allstate Ins Co (COA – UNP 3/30/2023; RB #4564) 
In this unanimous, unpublished, per curiam decision (Markey, concurring), the Court of Appeals reversed the trial court’s summary disposition order dismissing Plaintiff C-Spine Orthopedics, PLLC’s (“C-Spine”) action for No-Fault PIP benefits against Defendant Allstate Insurance Company (“Allstate”).  Relying on C-Spine Orthopedics, PLLC v Progressive Marathon Ins Co, ___ Mich App ___ (2022) (“C-Spine I”), the Court of Appeals held that C-Spine could sue Allstate for PIP benefits it assigned to various factoring companies, and despite the fact that C-Spine did not obtain counter-assignments from the factoring companies—reinvesting C-Spine with the right to pursue the benefits in litigation against Allstate—until after filing suit.  Under MCR 2.201(B)(1), ‘a person authorized by statute may sue in his or her own name without joining the party for whose benefit the action is brought,’ and under MCL 500.3112, providers can assert direct causes of action against insurers.  Thus, even though C-Spine filed suit before obtaining counter-assignments from the factoring companies, it could still sue Progressive for the assigned benefits in its own name, and without joining the factoring companies.

Shaw, et al v Nowakowski, et al (COA – UNP 3/30/2023; RB #4563) 
In this 2-1, unpublished decision (Markey, dissenting), the Court of Appeals affirmed the trial court’s denial of Defendant The Auto Club Group’s (“Auto Club”) motion for summary disposition, in which it sought dismissal of Plaintiffs Randall Shaw and Hillary Shaw’s action for underinsured motorist (“UIM”) coverage against it.  The Court of Appeals held that the driver who caused the subject motor vehicle accident—who had bodily injury liability coverage of up to $300,000—was operating an “underinsured vehicle” for purposes of the Shaws’ policy with Auto Club.  The Auto Club policy provided for UIM coverage up to $250,000 per person/$500,000 per accident, and contained a typical exclusion from coverage if the limits of the tortfeasor’s policy exceeded the limits of UIM coverage.  The Court held that the $500,000 “per accident” limit—not the $250,000 “per person” limit—was the relevant amount for determining whether the exclusion applied, because both Randall Shaw and Hillary Shaw were “insured persons” under the policy and were entitled to up to $500,000 for the accident.  The Court of Appeals held, second, that based on the language of the Shaws’ policy, UIM coverage could not be reduced by any amount paid or payable by the liability insurer of the bar, Defendant Crispelli’s LLC (“Crispelli’s”), which served intoxicating liquor to the driver who caused the accident.

Robinson v Wolverine Mut Ins Co (COA – UNP 3/30/2023; RB #4562) 
In this 2-1, unpublished, decision (Swartzle, dissenting), the Court of Appeals reversed the trial court’s summary disposition order dismissing Plaintiff Benjamin Robinson’s action for No-Fault PIP benefits against Defendant Wolverine Mutual Insurance Company (“Wolverine”).  After filing suit against Wolverine—the insurer of the vehicle Robinson was driving at the time of the subject accident—Robinson answered an interrogatory by stating that he had personal No-Fault insurance through AAA at the time of the accident.  When Wolverine moved for summary disposition on the basis of Robinson’s answer and MCL 500.3114, Robinson filed an amended answer to the interrogatory and an affidavit claiming that his original answer was incorrect, and that he was not, in fact, insured through AAA at the time of the accident.  The Court of Appeals held that Robinson’s amended answer and affidavit should have been considered by the trial court in ruling on Wolverine’s motion, and that they created a question of fact precluding summary disposition.

AdvisaCare Healthcare Solutions, Inc v Progressive Marathon Ins Co (COA – UNP 3/30/2023; RB #4561) 
In this unanimous, unpublished, per curiam decision, the Court of Appeals affirmed in part, and vacated in part, the trial court’s order granting Plaintiff AdvisaCare Healthcare Solutions, Inc.’s (“AdvisaCare”) motion to re-open its case against Defendant Progressive Marathon Insurance Company (“Progressive”).  The parties reached a settlement in AdvisaCare’s action for No-Fault PIP benefits, after which they executed a settlement agreement which explicitly provided that certain charges for medical equipment would be excluded from the settlement amount because Progressive had already agreed to pay them.  The settlement agreement also said that any disputes regarding the terms of the agreement would remain within the trial court’s jurisdiction under the established case number.  AdvisaCare later claimed that Progressive did not pay six of the equipment charges specified in the settlement agreement (Progressive presented evidence that it had, in fact, paid four of the charges), and thus the trial court granted AdvisaCare’s motion to have the case re-opened, and ordered Progressive to pay for all six equipment charges, as well as attorney fees under MCL 500.3148(1).  The Court of Appeals held that the trial court did not err in reopening the case, but that it could not order Progressive to issue duplicate payments on the four charges it had already paid.  The Court also vacated the trial court’s award of attorney fees, and remanded to the trial court to recalculate the amount in light of its holdings.

McLaughlin v Tavenner, et al (COA – UNP 3/23/2023; RB #4560) 
In this unanimous, unpublished, per curiam decision, the Court of Appeals affirmed in part, and vacated in part, the trial court’s order awarding attorney fees to Plaintiff Marvel McLaughlin, after finding that Defendant Allstate Fire & Casualty Insurance Company (“Allstate”) unreasonably delayed in paying McLaughlin’s work loss benefits and allowable expense benefits, as well as a lien asserted by McLaughlin’s health insurer.  The Court of Appeals held, first, that the trial court did not err in finding Allstate’s approximately 11-month delay in paying McLaughlin’s work loss benefits “unreasonable,” where Allstate never communicated to McLaughlin what additional information it needed to process her claim, or even that it did, apparently, need additional information to process her claim.  The Court of Appeals held, second, that the trial court did not err in finding Allstate’s 12-month delay in paying a lien asserted by McLaughlin’s health insurer “unreasonable,” where Allstate conceded at a pretrial hearing more than year after receiving notice of the lien that it did not know why the lein had not been paid.  The Court of Appeals held, third, that the trial court failed to conduct a ‘fact-specific inquiry’ before determining that Allstate unreasonably delayed in paying McLaughlin’s other medical expenses.  And the Court of Appeals held, fourth, that the trial court failed to follow the proper process for determining attorney fees under MCL 500.3148(1)—set forth in Pirgu v United Servs Auto Ass’n, 499 Mich 269 (2016)—before determining calculating the fee amount.  Thus, the Court remanded to the trial court to conduct the aforementioned ‘fact-specific inquiry’ and to complete the Pirgu analysis before ordering an award.

Maple Manor Rehab Center of Novi, Inc, et al v Progressive Mich Ins, et al (COA – UNP 3/16/2023; RB #4559) 
In this unanimous, unpublished, per curiam decision, the Court of Appeals reversed the trial court’s summary disposition order dismissing Plaintiffs Maple Manor Rehab Center of Novi, Inc. (“Maple Manor Rehab Center”) and Maple Manor Neuro Center, Inc.’s (“Maple Manor Neuro Center”) action for unpaid No-Fault PIP benefits against Defendant Progressive Michigan Insurance (“Progressive”).  The Court of Appeals held that a question of fact existed as to whether the treatment at issue was provided by Maple Manor Rehab Center—a licensed health care provider—or Maple Manor Neuro Center—which was not a licensed health care provider and held itself out as merely the billing agent for Maple Manor Rehab Center.  If provided by Maple Manor Rehab Center, the services would have been “lawfully rendered” for purposes of MCL 500.3157. 

Maple Manor Rehab Center of Novi, Inc, et al v Allstate Ins Co, et al (COA – UNP 3/16/2023; RB #4558) 
In this unanimous, unpublished, per curiam decision, the Court of Appeals reversed the trial court’s summary disposition order dismissing Plaintiffs Maple Manor Rehab Center of Novi, Inc. (“Maple Manor Rehab Center”) and Maple Manor Neuro Center, Inc.’s (“Maple Manor Neuro Center”) action for unpaid No-Fault PIP benefits against Defendant Allstate Insurance Company (“Allstate”).  The Court of Appeals held that a question of fact existed as to whether the treatment at issue was provided by Maple Manor Rehab Center—a licensed health care provider—or Maple Manor Neuro Center—which was not a licensed health care provider and held itself out as merely the billing agent for Maple Manor Rehab Center.  If provided by Maple Manor Rehab Center, the services would have been “lawfully rendered” for purposes of MCL 500.3157.

Health Partners, Inc v Progressive Mich Ins Co (COA – UNP 3/9/2023; RB #4557) 
In this unanimous, unpublished, per curiam decision, the Court of Appeals reversed the trial court’s denial of Defendant Progressive Michigan Insurance Company’s (“Progressive”) motion for summary disposition, in which Progressive sought dismissal of Plaintiff Health Partners, Inc.’s (“Health Partners”) action for unpaid No-Fault PIP benefits against it.  The claims at issue all accrued prior to June 11, 2019, and thus, in reliance on Spine Specialists of Michigan, PC v MemberSelect Ins Co ___ Mich App ___ (2023), the Court of Appeals held that the former version of MCL 500.3145 applied to this case, and that Health Partners’ claims were barred thereunder.

Reid v Progressive Mich Ins Co (COA – UNP 3/9/2023; RB #4556) 
In this unanimous, unpublished, per curiam decision, the Court of Appeals reversed the trial court’s denial of Defendant Progressive Michigan Insurance Company’s (“Progressive”) motion for summary disposition, in which Progressive sought dismissal of Plaintiff Krystyna Reid’s action for No-Fault PIP benefits against it.  The Court of Appeals held, first, that the pre-2019-amendment version of MCL 500.3145 applied to Reid’s claims for benefits related to services she received prior to June 11, 2019 (the amendment’s effective date), and that the post-amendment version of MCL 500.3145 (which introduced “formal denial” tolling) applied to Reid’s claims for benefits related to services she received after June 11, 2019.  Therefore, Reid—who filed her lawsuit on November 4, 2020—was barred from recovery on her pre-June 11, 2019 claims by the former version of the one-year-back rule.  The Court also held, however, that Reid was barred from recovery on her post-June 11, 2019 claims, as well, because the facts showed that she did not actually submit those claims until after filing her lawsuit, and thus could not avail herself of “formal denial” tolling.

Progressive Mich Ins Co v Centria Home Rehab, LLC (COA – UNP 3/9/2023; RB #4555) 
In this unanimous, unpublished, per curiam decision, the Court of Appeals reversed the trial court’s summary disposition order dismissing Defendant Centria Home Rehabilitation’s (“Centria”) counterclaim against Plaintiff Progressive Michigan Insurance Company (“Progressive”), in which Centria sought the difference between what it billed for treatment rendered to Samantha Calhoun, and what Progressive paid for said treatment.  Progressive argued that under McGill v Auto Ass’n of Mich, 207 Mich App 402 (1994) and LaMothe v Auto Club Ins Ass’n, 214 Mich App 577 (1995), Centria’s counterclaim had to be dismissed because “the proper method for challenging the reasonableness of an insurer’s payments to a healthcare provider is through a lawsuit brought by the provider against the insured.”  The Court of Appeals held, however, that this case was actually controlled by the recent decision in Centria Home Rehab, LLC v Philadelphia Indemnity Ins Co, ___ Mich App ___ (2023), in which it held that when there is a dispute between a provider and its patient’s insurer over the reasonableness of the provider’s charges, the provider does have standing to pursue the balance directly from the provider, especially if the provider is acting under an assignment, as was the case here.

Estate of Bell v Knapp, et al, et al (COA – UNP 3/9/2023; RB #4554) 
In this 2-1, unpublished decision (Kelly, dissenting), the Court of Appeals affirmed the trial court’s denial of Defendant Jeffrey Knapp’s motion for summary disposition, in which Knapp sought dismissal of Plaintiff Estate of Omari Bell’s (“the Estate”) wrongful death action against him.  The Court of Appeals held that a question of fact existed as to whether Knapp was negligent in running over Bell, a pedestrian.  Knapp testified that he did not see Bell walking on the freeway before crashing into him, but the Court noted that his testimony was subject to a credibility determination by the jury, especially considering two other motorists did observe Bell walking in the freeway and called 9-1-1 before Knapp crashed into him.

Kovach v Citizens Ins Co, et al (COA – UNP 3/2/2023; RB #4552) 
In this unanimous, unpublished, per curiam decision, the Court of Appeals affirmed the trial court’s summary disposition order dismissing Plaintiff Kenneth Kovach’s action for No-Fault PIP benefits against Defendant Citizens Insurance Company (“Citizens”).  Applying McPherson v McPherson, 493 Mich 294 (2013) to the case at bar, the Court of Appeals held that Kovach was not entitled to PIP benefits for the treatment of a subdural hematoma he developed after a fall.  The fall was caused by vertigo Kovach developed after suffering a concussion in a motor vehicle accident, but under McPherson, the Court held that the relationship between the hematoma and the motor vehicle accident was too attenuated for Kovach to be entitled to PIP benefits under MCL 500.3105(1).

Ridenour v Progressive Marathon Ins Co (COA – UNP 3/2/2023; RB #4551) 
In this unanimous, unpublished, per curiam decision (Shapiro, concurring), the Court of Appeals affirmed the trial court’s summary disposition order dismissing Plaintiff Zachary Ridenour’s action for No-Fault PIP benefits against Defendant Progressive Marathon Insurance Company (“Progressive”).  The Court of Appeals held, first, that although Ridenour was listed as an “additional driver” on his friend, Floyd Layport’s policy with Progressive, Progressive was neither Ridenour’s insurer, nor in the order of priority for payment of Ridenour’s PIP benefits related to the accident.  The Court of Appeals held, second, that Progressive was not precluded from raising its priority defense by the “mend-the-hold” doctrine, which Ridenour argued applied because Progressive originally denied his claim based on fraud.  The Court of Appeals held, third, that the trial court did not err in denying Ridenour’s motion to amend his complaint to add a claim for promissory estoppel, because Ridenour failed to identify any promise Progressive made to him regarding PIP coverage when it added him as an “additional driver” to Layport’s policy.

Centria Home Rehab, LLC v Philadelphia Indemnity Ins Co, et al (COA – PUB 3/2/2023; RB #4550) 
In this unanimous, published, per curiam decision, the Court of Appeals reversed the trial court’s summary disposition order dismissing Plaintiff Centria Home Rehabilitation, LLC’s (“Centria”) action for unpaid No-Fault PIP benefits against Defendant Philadelphia Indemnity Insurance Company (“Philadelphia”).  Centria provided treatment to Nicholas Randall—Philadelphia’s insured—but Philadelphia paid only a fraction of Centria’s charges.  Centria obtained an assignment from Randall and filed suit over the unpaid balance, but Philadelphia moved for summary disposition, invoking McGill v Auto Ass’n of Mich, 207 Mich App 402 (1995) and LaMothe v Auto Club Ins Ass’n, 214 Mich App 577 (1996).  Philadelphia argued that because it had an obligation to defend and indemnify Randall if Centria ever sued him over his unpaid balance, Randall (or his assignee, standing in his shoes) had not suffered any injury as a result of Philadelphia’s refusal to pay Centria’s full charges, and therefore had no cause of action.  The Court of Appeals disagreed, distinguishing McGill and LaMothe based on (1) the fact that those cases did not involve assignments and (2) the fact that in neither of those cases did the healthcare providers, themselves, actually take issue with the partial payments.  The Court of Appeals also noted that “the implications of a ruling in defendant’s favor are fraught with peril and uncertainty,” and that to agree with defendant’s position “would be contrary to the purpose of the no-fault act, which is to ‘provid[e] assured, adequate, and prompt recovery for economic loss arising from motor vehicle accidents.’ ”  Thus, the Court held that in cases such as this, insureds or their assignee providers can pursue unpaid balances from insurers in litigation, which is vastly preferable to providers suing their patients to settle “reasonable charge” disputes.

Advance Therapy & Rehab Inc v Auto-Owners Ins Co (COA – PUB 3/2/2023; RB #4549) 
In this unanimous, published decision authored by Judge Swartzle, the Court of Appeals affirmed the trial court’s denial of Defendant Auto-Owners Insurance Company’s (“Auto-Owners”) motion for summary disposition, in which it sought dismissal of Plaintiff Advance Therapy & Rehab Inc’s (“Advance Therapy”) action for No-Fault PIP benefits.  The Court of Appeals held that under the “excess medical” provision in Andre Yglesias’s coordinated No-Fault policy, Auto-Owners had to pay for the treatment he received from Advance Therapy—an out-of-network provider which, although covered under Yglesias’s preferred provider organization (“PPO”) health insurance plan, was more expensive to Yglesias than in-network treatment.

Farm Bureau Gen Ins Co of Mich v State Farm Mut Auto Ins Co, et al (COA – UNP 2/21/2023; RB #4547) 
In this unanimous, unpublished, per curiam decision, the Court of Appeals reversed the trial court’s denial of Plaintiff Farm Bureau General Insurance Company of Michigan’s (“Farm Bureau”) motion for summary disposition, in which it sought a declaration from the trial court that Defendant State Farm Mutual Automobile Insurance Company (“State Farm”) was the highest priority insurer with respect to David Munger’s claim for No-Fault PIP benefits.  After evaluating the factors for determining a No-Fault claimant’s domicile at the time of a motor vehicle accident, set forth in Workman v Detroit Auto Inter-Ins Exchange, 404 Mich 477 (1979) and Dairyland Ins Co v Auto Owners Ins Co, 123 Mich App 675 (1983), the Court of Appeals held that a question of fact existed as to whether Munger was domiciled with his parents—State Farm’s insureds—or his girlfriend’s grandparents—Farm Bureau’s insureds—at the time of the subject accident.

Buller v Titan Ins Co, et al (COA – UNP 2/21/2023; RB #4548) 
In this unanimous, unpublished, per curiam decision, the Court of Appeals affirmed the trial court’s order granting Plaintiff Brandon Buller a preliminary injunction against Defendant Titan Insurance Company (“Titan”), preventing Titan from applying the new No-Fault fee schedule to Buller’s claim for PIP benefits—which arose out of a motor vehicle accident in 1994—during the pendency of the case.  Considering its recent decision in Andary v USAA Cas Ins Co, ___ Mich App ___ (2022), the Court of Appeals held that the trial court did not abuse its discretion by awarding a preliminary injunction against Titan, ordering that, for the remainder of litigation, Titan continue paying for Buller’s care at the rate the parties agreed upon prior to the 2019 amendments to the No-Fault Act.

Johnson v Suburban Mobility Auth for Regional Transp, et al (COA – UNP 2/16/2023; RB #4546) 
In this unanimous, unpublished, per curiam decision, the Court of Appeals affirmed the trial court’s denial of Defendant Suburban Mobility Authority for Regional Transportation’s (“SMART”) motion for summary disposition, in which it sought dismissal of Plaintiff Samone Johnson’s auto negligence action.  The Court of Appeals held that a question of fact existed as to whether Ronald Pressley—the driver of the SMART bus Johnson was traveling on—was negligent in rear-ending a vehicle whose driver, Shane Webster, changed into Pressley’s lane, then slammed on his brakes to avoid rear-ending the vehicle in front of him.

C-Spine Orthopedics, PLLC v Progressive Marathon Ins Co (COA – UNP 2/9/2023; RB #4544) 
In this unanimous, unpublished, per curiam decision, the Court of Appeals reversed the trial court’s summary disposition order dismissing Plaintiff C-Spine Orthopedics, PLLC’s (“C-Spine”) action for No-Fault PIP benefits against Defendant Progressive Marathon Insurance Company (“Progressive”).  Relying on C-Spine Orthopedics, PLLC v Progressive Marathon Ins Co, ___ Mich App ___ (2022) (“C-Spine I”), the Court of Appeals held that C-Spine could sue Progressive for PIP benefits it assigned to various factoring companies, even before (or without) obtaining counter-assignments from the factoring companies.  Under MCR 2.201(B)(1), ‘a person authorized by statute may sue in his or her own name without joining the party for whose benefit the action is brought,’ and under MCL 500.3112, providers can assert direct causes of action against insurers.  Thus, even if C-Spine filed suit before obtaining counter-assignments from the factoring companies, it could still sue Progressive for the assigned benefits in its own name, without joining the factoring companies.

Farrar, et al v Suburban Mobility Auth for Regional Transp (COA – PUB 2/9/2023; RB #4543) 
In this unanimous, published, per curiam decision, the Court of Appeals reversed the trial court’s denial of Defendant Suburban Mobility Authority for Regional Transportation’s (“SMART”) motions for summary disposition, in which it sought dismissal of Plaintiff Focus Imaging, LLC’s (“Focus”) action for No-Fault PIP benefits, as well as certain aspects of Plaintiff Marcel Farrar’s action for No-Fault PIP benefits..  The Court of Appeals held, first, that Focus Imaging, LLC (“Focus”)— Farrar’s treater/assignee, and an intervening plaintiff in Farrar’s action against SMART—could not rely on the filing date of Farrar’s action  for purposes of the  one-year-back rule under MCL 500.3145, reasoning that Focus Imaging was pursuing the same claims of plaintiff but as a different part, and, therefore, Focus’ complaint did not relate back to the filing date Farrar’s complaint The Court of Appeals held, second, that Farrar could not sue SMART for benefits he had assigned to various other providers because he was no longer the real party in interest with respect to those benefits.

Mauer v Farm Bureau Gen Ins Co (COA – UNP 2/9/2023; RB #4545) 
In this unanimous, unpublished, per curiam decision, the Court of Appeals affirmed the trial court’s award of attorney fees to Plaintiff Beth Maurer, after a jury returned a verdict in her favor in her action for No-Fault PIP benefits against Defendant Farm Bureau General Insurance Company (“Farm Bureau”).  The Court of Appeals held that the trial court did not err in finding that it was unreasonable for Farm Bureau to withhold Maurer’s PIP benefits.  Farm Bureau based its denial on (1) the opinions of two insurance medical examiners (“IMEs”), and (2) the fact that Maurer failed to complete a detoxification program it insisted she undergo, but the Court found the examiners’ opinions dubious—especially in light of the contrary opinions of Maurer’s actual treating physicians—and found no authority in support of Farm Bureau’s argument that it could make payment of Maurer’s PIP benefits contingent on her undergoing a detoxification program.

Hannah v Raspotnik, et al (COA – UNP 2/2/2023; RB #4542) 
In this unanimous, unpublished, per curiam decision, the Court of Appeals affirmed (1) the trial court’s denial of Defendant Mason County Road Commission’s (“MCRC”) motion for summary disposition, in which it sought dismissal of Plaintiff Dustin Hannah’s automobile negligence action on governmental immunity grounds, (2) the trial court’s dismissal of Hannah’s gross negligence count against Stanley Raspotnik, and (3) the trial court’s denial of Hannah’s motion for sanctions, filed in response to what he argued was a frivolous motion filed by the defendants’ regarding “serious impairment of body function.”  The Court of Appeals held, preliminarily, that it had jurisdiction over MCRC’s appeal—brought under MCR 7.202(6)(a)(v)—because the trial court effectively denied MCRC’s claim of governmental immunity by finding that a question of fact existed as to whether Raspotnik was negligent in causing the subject accident.  The Court of Appeals held, second, that a question of fact existed as to whether Hannah’s oncoming vehicle presented an “immediate hazard” to Raspotnik, such that Raspotnik should have remained stopped at his flashing red light before proceeding into the intersection where the accident occurred.  The Court held, third, that even if Raspotnik failed to check his blind spot before entering the intersection, such a failure does not rise to the level of gross negligence.  And the Court held, fourth, that it was not clearly erroneous for the trial court to have found that the defendants’ motion for summary disposition—regarding Hannah’s injuries and the “serious impairment of body function standard” in MCL 500.3135—was not frivolous.  The defendants filed their motion despite having spoken to Hannah’s neurosurgeon four months prior—the same neurosurgeon who later executed an affidavit averring that Hannah’s lumbar spine injuries were accident-related.  Hannah argued that the neurosurgeon ‘must’ have shared his opinion regarding causation with the defendants during this earlier conversation, but the Court of Appeals held that that was purely speculative.

Reed v State Farm Mut Auto Ins Co (COA – UNP 1/26/2023; RB #4541) 
In this unanimous, unpublished, per curiam decision, the Court of Appeals reversed the trial court’s summary disposition order dismissing Plaintiff Harley Reed’s action for No-Fault PIP benefits against Defendant State Farm Mutual Automobile Insurance Company (“State Farm”).  The Court of Appeals held that a question of fact existed as to whether Reed committed fraud when making representations about his injuries to State Farm, and whether State Farm could deny his claim as a result.  Notably, the Court of Appeals declined to apply Williams v Farm Bureau Mut Ins Co of Mich, 335 Mich App 574 (2021) to this case, because State Farm was seeking to deny Reed’s claim for PIP benefits under his policy, not void his policy altogether. The Court further  interpreted Meemic Ins Co v Fortson, 506 Mich 287 (2020) as standing for the proposition that the Plaintiff’s  entire claim for PIP benefits could be denied on the basis of fraud, even aspects of it that are unrelated to any fraud.

Progressive Marathon Ins Co v Pena, et al (COA – PUB 1/26/2023; RB #4538) 
In this unanimous, published decision authored by Judge Murray, the Court of Appeals reversed the trial court’s order denying Plaintiff Progressive Marathon Insurance Company’s (“Progressive”) motion for summary disposition.  The Court of Appeals held that  automobile insurance policy, issued prior to July 2, 2020 and providing bodily injury liability coverage up to $20,000 per person/$40,000 per occurrence, were not  automatically converted into a policy with bodily injury liability coverage of at least $250,000 per person/$500,000 per occurrence on July 2, 2020, under the amended version of MCL 500.3009. The Court of Appeals reasoned that such automatic conversion did not occur, , just as the various subsections of the No-Fault Act which also provided for coverage changes effective July 1, 2020 (MCL 500.3107c, MCL 500.3107d, MCL 500.3109a, and MCL 500.3135) did not affect policies issued prior to July 1, 2020. 

Rodriguez v Farmers Ins Exch (COA – UNP 1/26/2023; RB #4540) 
In this unanimous, unpublished, per curiam decision, the Court of Appeals affirmed the trial court’s summary disposition order dismissing Plaintiff David Rodriguez’s action for No-Fault PIP benefits against Defendant Farmers Insurance Exchange (“Farmers”).  The Court of Appeals held that there was no question of fact that Rodriguez committed a “fraudulent insurance act” for purposes of MCL 500.3173a(2), by failing to disclose numerous past injuries and medical events in his application for PIP benefits through the MAIPF.

Al-Hajjaj v Hartford Accident and Indemnity Co, et al (COA – PUB 1/26/2023; RB #4539) 
In this unanimous, published decision authored by Judge Swartzle, the Court of Appeals reversed the trial court’s denial of Defendant Hartford Accident and Indemnity Company’s (“Hartford”) motion for summary disposition, in which it sought dismissal of Plaintiff Ahmed Al-Hajjaj’s action for No-Fault PIP benefits.  At issue was whether an independent insurance agency, Golden Insurance Agency, LLC (“Golden”), was acting as an agent of Al-Hajjaj (insured), or Hartford (insurer), when it facilitated Al-Hajjaj’s purchase of a Hartford commercial automobile insurance policy.  The Court of Appeals ultimately held that Golden was an agent of Al-Hajjaj with respect to the transaction, despite (1) 2018 amendments to Chapter 12 of the Insurance Code which the Court noted might, under certain circumstances (none present in this case), abrogate the common law principle that an independent insurance agent is an agent of the insured, not the insurer, and (2) a standard independent insurance agent contract between Golden and Hartford.

Withers, et al v Sentinel Ins Co Ltd, et al (COA – UNP 1/20/2023; RB #4535) 
In this unanimous, unpublished, per curiam decision, the Court of Appeals reversed the trial court’s summary disposition order in favor of Defendant Sentinel Insurance Company Limited (“Limited”), in Sentinel’s priority dispute with Defendant Progressive Michigan Insurance Company (“Progressive”).  The Court of Appeals held that a question of fact existed as to whether Cherisse Withers’s ongoing medical treatment were related to injuries she sustained in either a 2010 motor vehicle accident—at which time she was insured by Sentinel—or a 2012 motor vehicle accident—at which time she was insured by Progressive—or both.

Richardson v Menifee, et al (COA – UNP 1/19/2023; RB #4537) 
In this unanimous, unpublished, per curiam decision, the Court of Appeals vacated the trial court’s summary disposition order dismissing Plaintiff Diana Richardson’s (as personal representative of the Estate of Naomi Richardson) action for No-Fault PIP benefits against Defendant Integon National Insurance Company (“Integon”), and remanded for consideration of whether Integon should be permitted to amend its affirmative defenses to allege fraud against Richardson with the required specificity applicable to fraud.  The Court of Appeals held that Integon failed to set forth specific facts regarding Richardson’s alleged fraud in its affirmative defenses, as is required by Glasker-Davis v Auvenshire, 333 Mich App 222 (2020), but that it should be allowed to move to amend its affirmative defenses.

Flint Region ASC, LLC v Hartford Accident & Indemnity Co (COA – UNP 1/19/2023; RB #4533) 
In this unanimous, unpublished, per curiam decision, the Court of Appeals reversed the trial court’s summary disposition order dismissing Plaintiff Flint Region ASC, LLC’s (“ASC”) action for No-Fault PIP benefits against Defendant Hartford Accident & Indemnity Company (“Hartford”).  The Court of Appeals held that under Mecosta Co Med Ctr v Metro Group Prop & Cas Ins Co, ___ Mich ___ (2022), ASC’s claim was not barred by res judicata, which Hartford sought to invoke based on the fact that ASC’s patient/assignor, Thomas Fields, settled his separate lawsuit against Hartford, releasing Hartford from liability for any past and future PIP benefits related to the accident.  ASC obtained its assignment before Fields and Hartford settled Fields’s separate lawsuit, and thus, under Mecosta, ASC could not be said to have been in privity with Fields at the time of settlement for purposes of res judicata.

Centria Home Rehab, LLC, et al v Progressive Marathon Ins Co, et al (COA – UNP 1/19/2023; RB #4536) 
In this unanimous, unpublished, per curiam decision, the Court of Appeals affirmed the trial court’s summary disposition order dismissing Plaintiff Residential Care Solutions, LLC’s (“RCS”) action for No-Fault PIP benefits against Defendant Progressive Marathon Insurance Company (“Progressive”).  The Court of Appeals held that under Admire v Auto-Owners Ins Co, 494 Mich 10 (2013), Alonzo White’s rent payments for the ADA-accessible housing he required as a result of the catastrophic injuries he sustained in a motor vehicle accident were not compensable under the No-Fault Act. 

Alkasemi v Auto-Owners Ins Co (COA – UNP 1/19/2023; RB #4531) 
In this unanimous, unpublished, per curiam decision, the Court of Appeals reversed the trial court’s summary disposition order dismissing Plaintiff Tracy Alkasemi (as Guardian of Hannah Tabroksi, LIP) claim for attorney fees against Defendant Auto-Owners Insurance Company (“Auto-Owners”), and remanded for the Court to properly address Alkasemi’s claim for penalty interest.  With respect to Alkasemi’s claim for attorney fees, the Court of Appeals held that Auto-Owners unreasonably delayed in making payment of Tabroski’s PIP benefits.  Auto-Owners waited approximately one year after Tabroski was injured in a motorcycle-versus-motor vehicle accident to pay Tabroski’s PIP benefits, based on its adjuster’s belief that the burden of proof was on Tabroski to prove that she was not a constructive owner of the motorcycle involved in the accident, which she was traveling on as a passenger at the time.  The Court of Appeals noted that “the law places the burden on defendant to justify a delay in coverage,” and that there was never any evidence to suggest that Tabroski was a constructive owner of the motorcycle.

Home-Owners Ins Co v AMCO Ins Co (COA – UNP 1/19/2023; RB #4529)
In this unanimous, unpublished, per curiam decision, the Court of Appeals reversed the trial court’s denial of Defendant AMCO Insurance Company’s (“AMCO”) motion for summary disposition, in which AMCO sought reimbursement from Plaintiff Home-Owners Insurance Company (“Home-Owners”) for the amount it paid to settle the tort claim of Jerry Wineland.  The Court of Appeals held that a no-action clause in Home-Owners’ policy was not enforceable under the particular circumstances present in the case and  that AMCO was not barred from proceeding with its action for reimbursement.  The Court did, however, remand for a determination of whether AMCO settled with Wineland in good faith, as well as a determination of whether the settlement amount was reasonable.

King, et al v Select Specialists, LLC, et al (COA – PUB 1/19/2023; RB #4528) 
In this unanimous, published decision authored by Judge Yates, the Court of Appeals affirmed the trial court’s summary disposition order dismissing Plaintiffs Tiffany Lachell King’s and Emanuel King, III’s claims for no-fault PIP benefits against Defendant Michigan Automobile Insurance Placement Facility (“MAIPF”), as well as Emanuel King’s auto negligence action against Defendant Mary Ann Page.  The Court of Appeals then reversed that portion of the trial court’s order dismissing Tiffany King’s auto negligence action against Page.  With respect to the Kings’ claims against the MAIPF, the Court of Appeals held that both Tiffany and Emanuel were barred from recovering PIP benefits relative to the subject accident by MCL 500.3113(b).  Both were Michigan residents at the time of the accident, and both were “owners” the vehicle involved, however, neither had in effect the security required by sections 3101 or 3103 of the No-Fault Act at the time of the accident.  With respect to Emanuel King’s claim against Page, the Court of Appeals held that King was barred from recovery in tort by MCL 500.3135(2)(c), because he constructively owned and was operating an uninsured vehicle involved in the accident.  With respect to Tiffany King’s claim against Page, the Court held that she was so barred because she was merely a passenger in the uninsured vehicle at the time of the accident.

Davis, Sr, et al v MetLife Ins Co, et al (COA – UNP 1/19/2023; RB #4532) 
In this unanimous, unpublished, per curiam decision, the Court of Appeals affirmed the trial court’s summary disposition order dismissing Plaintiff Joseph Davis, Sr.’s action for no-fault PIP benefits against Defendants MetLife Insurance Company (“MetLife”) and the Michigan Automobile Insurance Placement Facility (“MAIPF”).  The Court of Appeals held that there was no question of fact that Davis had taken the vehicle he was operating at the time of the accident “unlawfully” for purposes of MCL 500.3113(a), and that he was therefore barred from recovering PIP benefits under the vehicle’s owner’s No-Fault policy with MetLife.  The Court of Appeals further held that because Davis was barred from recovering PIP benefits under the MetLife policy by MCL 500.3113(a), he was also barred from recovering PIP benefits from the MAIPF by MCL 500.3173.

Farm Bureau v Meadows, et al (COA – UNP 1/12/2023; RB #4525) 
In this unanimous, unpublished, per curiam decision, the Court of Appeals reversed the trial court’s summary disposition order dismissing Defendant Pioneer State Mutual Insurance Company’s (“Pioneer”) motion for summary disposition, in which it sought dismissal of Plaintiff Farm Bureau Insurance Company’s (“Farm Bureau”) reimbursement action against it.  The Court of Appeals held that the equities weighed in favor of rescinding the subject Pioneer insurance policy, even as to the claim of an innocent third party thereunder.

Craig v Wegienka, et al (COA – UNP 1/12/2023; RB #4527) 
In this unanimous, unpublished, per curiam decision, the Court of Appeals affirmed the trial court’s summary disposition order dismissing Plaintiff Ethan Tyler Craig’s auto negligence action against Defendant Timothy Lee Wegienka.  The Court of Appeals held that Craig failed to present sufficient evidence to create a question of fact as to whether Wegienka’s conduct was the cause in fact of the subject motor vehicle-versus-pedestrian collision.

Jenkins v McCarver, et al (COA – UNP 1/12/2023; RB #4526) 
In this unanimous, unpublished, per curiam decision, the Court of Appeals reversed the trial court’s summary disposition order dismissing Plaintiff Johnna Jenkins’s (Personal Representative of the Estate of James Jenkins) action for no-fault PIP benefits against Defendant Farmers Insurance Exchange (“Farmers”).  The Court of Appeals held that a question of fact existed as to whether James Jenkins was a constructive owner of the uninsured motorcycle he was operating at the time of the subject accident, such as would preclude him from receiving PIP benefits for the injuries he sustained in the accident pursuant to MCL 500.3113(b).

Howard, et al v LM Gen Ins Co, et al (COA – PUB 1/12/2023; RB #4524) 
In this unanimous, published, per curiam decision, the Court of Appeals affirmed the trial court’s denial of Defendant LM General Insurance Company’s (“LM”) motion for summary disposition, seeking dismissal of Plaintiff Melvina Howard’s action for no-fault PIP benefits and underinsured motorist (“UIM”) coverage.  With respect to Howard’s claim for PIP benefits, the Court of Appeals held that LM could not rescind Howard’s policy and deny her claim thereunder based on misrepresentations Howard’s coinsured made regarding a vehicle that was not involved in the accident and was added to the policy approximately only after its original procurement.  With respect to Howard’s claim for UIM benefits, the Court held that although LM could deny coverage as to all insureds based on the misrepresentations of only one insured, it could not do so in this case, because the policy’s antifraud provision only allowed for voidance of the policy if the misrepresentation was of a “material fact or circumstance.”  In this case, the Court found, Howard’s coinsured’s misrepresentation was not material to Howard’s claim. 

Saucillo v City of Detroit, et al (COA – UNP 1/19/2023; RB #4534) 
In this unanimous, unpublished, per curiam decision, the Court of Appeals affirmed the trial court’s denial of Defendant City of Detroit’s motion for summary disposition, in which it sought dismissal of Plaintiff Jacqueline Saucillo’s auto negligence action.  The Court of Appeals held that Saucillo presented sufficient evidence to create a question of fact as to whether a City of Detroit bus driver was negligent in his operation of the bus Saucillo was traveling on at the time of her injuries.

LaPointe v Rojo, et al (COA – UNP 12/29/2022; RB #4522)   
In this unanimous, unpublished, per curiam decision, the Court of Appeals reversed the trial court’s denial of Defendant MemberSelect Insurance Company’s (“MemberSelect”) motion for summary disposition, in which it sought dismissal of Plaintiff Reba LaPointe’s action for no-fault PIP benefits against it.  LaPointe was entitled to claim no-fault benefits from MemberSelect for the post-concussive syndrome she developed as a result of a 2019 motor vehicle accident, but the Court held that, under McPherson v McPherson, 493 Mich 294 (2013), LaPointe was not entitled to no-fault PIP benefits for the fractured ankle she sustained as a result from a fall that was caused by her post-concussive syndrome.

Husinka Group, LLC v Farm Bureau Gen Ins Co of Mich, et al (COA – UNP 12/22/2022; RB #4515)   
In this unanimous, unpublished, per curiam decision, the Court of Appeals affirmed the trial court’s summary disposition order in favor of Plaintiff Husinka Group, LLC (“Husinka”), in Husinka’s first-party action seeking to recover unpaid no-fault PIP benefits from Defendant Farm Bureau General Insurance Company of Michigan (“Farm Bureau”).  The Court of Appeals vacated, however, the trial court’s awards of no-fault penalty interest and attorney fees to Husinka, and remanded for factual findings regarding the appropriateness of such awards.  In affirming the trial court’s summary disposition order, the Court of Appeals held that Farm Bureau failed to present any evidence to support its affirmative defense that it did not owe any additional benefits to Husinka—a subcontractor, hired by another home health agency, TheraSupport, to provide attendant care services to Roger Taliaferro, an individual catastrophically injured in a motor vehicle accident—because payment for Husinka’s services was included in a $900 per diem Farm Bureau paid to TheraSupport.  In vacating the trial court’s award of no-fault penalty interest, the Court of Appeals held that a question of fact existed as to whether payment on Husinka’s claim was overdue.  In vacating the trial court’s award of no-fault attorney fees, the Court of Appeals held that the trial court failed to make a factual determination, on the record, regarding the reasonableness of the Husinka’s claimed attorney fees. 

Steanhouse v Mich Auto Ins Placement Facility, et al (COA – PUB 12/22/2022; RB #4514)   
In this unanimous, published decision authored by Judge Garrett, the Court of Appeals reversed the trial court’s denial of Defendant Michigan Automobile Insurance Placement Facility’s (“MAIPF”) motion for summary disposition, in which it sought dismissal of Plaintiff Markise Steanhouse’s action against it.  Steanhouse was injured in a motor vehicle accident in Ohio and sought no-fault PIP benefits through the MAIPF, but the Court of Appeals held that Steanhouse was ineligible for PIP benefits through the MAIPF based on the plain language of MCL 500.3172, or because his accident did not occur in Michigan.  In so holding, the Court rejected Steanhouse’s two-fold argument that (1) his eligibility for PIP benefits relative to the accident was established by MCL 500.3111, and (2) because MCL 500.3172 conflicts with MCL 500.3111, the former could not be interpreted so as to deprive him of his right to benefits.

Maya v Omega Freight Systems, Inc, et al (COA – UNP 12/22/2022; RB #4520)   
In this unanimous, unpublished, per curiam decision, the Court of Appeals affirmed the trial court’s summary disposition order dismissing Plaintiff Elaine Maya’s automobile negligence action against Defendant Milos Borovnjak.  The trial court dismissed Maya’s action as a result of her failure to timely respond to Borovnjak’s motion for summary disposition, but, notably, the Court of Appeals also held that Maya’s action of abruptly stopping in the roadway created a sudden emergency for Borvnjak, who rear-ended Maya’s vehicle. 

Central Home Health Care Services v Liberty Mut Ins Co (COA – UNP 12/22/2022; RB #4519)   
In this unanimous, unpublished, per curiam decision, the Court of Appeals reversed the trial court’s summary disposition order dismissing Plaintiff Central Home Health Care Services’ (“Central”) action for no-fault PIP benefits against Defendant Liberty Mutual Insurance Company (“Liberty Mutual”).  The Court of Appeals held that the trial court erred when it ruled, as a matter of law, that Central could not establish that its patient/Liberty Mutual’s insured, Sean Smith, was injured in a motor vehicle accident because Smith, himself, was stricken as a witness and not permitted to testify at trial.  The trial court was required to consider whether the facts of the accident and the nature and extent of Smith’s injuries could have been established by other forms of documentary evidence.

Wyoming Chiropractic Health Clinic, PC v Falls Lake Ins Co (COA – UNP 12/22/2022; RB #4518)   
In this unanimous, unpublished, per curiam decision, the Court of Appeals affirmed the trial court’s denial of Defendant Falls Lake Insurance Company’s (“Falls Lake”) motion for summary disposition, in which it sought to dismiss Plaintiff Wyoming Chiropractic Health Clinic, PC’s (“Wyoming”) action for no-fault PIP benefits against it.  The Court of Appeals held that a question of fact existed as to whether Betty Austin—Falls Lake’s insured/Wyoming’s patient—committed actionable fraud when she provided inaccurate answers on her application for no-fault coverage with Falls Lake, such as would allow Falls Lake to rescind her policy and deny Wyoming’s claims thereunder.

Burns v Farm Bureau Mut Ins Co of Mich, et al  (COA – UNP 12/22/2022; RB #4517)   
In this unanimous, unpublished, per curiam decision, the Court of Appeals affirmed the trial court’s order dismissing Plaintiff Juan Burns’s first-party action for no-fault PIP benefits against Defendant Farm Bureau Mutual Insurance Company of Michigan (“Farm Bureau”).  The Court of Appeals held that the trial court did not abuse its discretion by dismissing Burns’s action as a sanction for failing to comply with multiple discovery orders.

Orvis, et al v Moore  (COA – UNP 12/22/2022; RB #4516)   
In this unanimous, unpublished, per curiam decision, the Court of Appeals reversed the trial court’s summary disposition order dismissing Plaintiff Michelle Orvis’s automobile negligence action against Defendant Thomas Allen Moore.  The Court of Appeals held that a question of fact existed as to whether Orvis satisfied the first and third prongs of the test for ‘serious impairment of body function’ set forth in McCormick v Carrier, 487 Mich 180 (2010)—specifically, whether she suffered an objectively manifested impairment as a result of the subject crash, and whether any such impairment affected her general ability to lead her normal life.

Whitney v Wilcoxson, et al (COA – UNP 12/15/2022; RB #4513)   
In this unanimous, unpublished, per curiam decision, the Court of Appeals reversed the trial court’s summary disposition order dismissing Plaintiff Robert Whitney’s auto-negligence action against Defendant Neal Marvin Wilcoxson.  The Court of Appeals held that a question of fact existed as to whether Whitney was “operating” his uninsured vehicle at the time Wilcoxson crashed into him, such as would preclude Whitney from recovering noneconomic damages under MCL 500.3135(2)(c).

C-Spine Orthopedics, PLLC v Progressive Mich Ins Co (COA – PUB 12/8/2022; RB #4512)   
In this 2-1, published decision authored by Judge Gleicher (Markey, dissenting), the Court of Appeals reversed the trial court’s summary disposition order dismissing Plaintiff C-Spine Orthopedics, PLLC’s (“C-Spine”) action for unpaid no-fault PIP benefits against Defendant Progressive Michigan Insurance Company (“Progressive”).  To deal with cash flow issues, C-Spine sold Sandra Cruz’s and Jose Cruz-Muniz’s account balances to various factoring companies, assigning to the factoring companies the right to pursue payment on the accounts from Progressive, the priority no-fault insurer for the Cruz’s claims.  The factoring companies later executed counter-assignments, assigning back to C-Spine the right to pursue payment on both accounts.  The Court of Appeals held that, pursuant to the counter-assignments, C-Spine could again pursue payment of the unpaid no-fault PIP benefits which comprised the outstanding account balances from Progressive. 

Wenkel v Farm Bureau Gen Ins Co of Mich (COA – PUB 12/1/2022; RB #4511)   
In this unanimous, published, per curiam decision, the Court of Appeals affirmed the trial court’s summary disposition order dismissing Plaintiff Dustin Wenkel’s action for unpaid no-fault PIP benefits against Farm Bureau General Insurance Company of Michigan (“Farm Bureau”).  The Court of Appeals held that the administrative order issued by the Michigan Supreme Court at the beginning of the COVID-19 pandemic—which tolled statutes of limitations for filing civil actions—did not toll the one-year-back rule set forth in MCL 500.3145, nor did it toll an agreement between the parties to toll the one-year-back rule until a specified date.

Darling, et al v State Farm Mut Auto Ins Co (COA – UNP 11/17/2022; RB #4510)  
In this unanimous, unpublished, per curiam decision, the Court of Appeals vacated the trial court’s denial of Defendant State Farm’s Mutual Automobile Insurance Company’s (“State Farm”) motion to dismiss Plaintiff Hannah Darling’s action for no-fault PIP benefits.  The Court of Appeals held that the trial court abused its discretion by denying State Farm’s motion—which was based on Darling’s failure to attend insurance medical examinations (“IME(s)”) both the Court of Appeals (in a prior order) and the trial court ordered her to attend—without first considering the factors set forth in Vicencio v Ramirez, 211 Mich App 501 (1995).  However, rather than remanding for an order granting State Farm’s motion to dismiss, the Court of Appeals remanded with instructions to the trial court that it conduct a Vicencio analysis and determine the appropriate sanction for Darling’s discovery violations.

Morrissette, et al v Indian Harbor Ins Co, et al (COA – UNP 11/17/2022; RB #4509)
In this unanimous, unpublished, per curiam decision, the Court of Appeals affirmed the trial court’s summary disposition order dismissing Plaintiff Enita Morrissette’s action for unpaid no-fault PIP benefits from Defendant Indian Harbor Insurance Company (“Indian Harbor”). The Court of Appeals held that Morrissette’s claim was barred by MCL 500.3145(1) because she failed to give Indian Harbor notice of her injuries within one year of the accident.

Spine Specialists of Mich, PC v MemberSelect Ins Co (COA – PUB 11/17/2022; RB #4508)   
In this unanimous, unpublished, per curiam decision, the Court of Appeals affirmed the trial court’s partial summary disposition order dismissing certain of Plaintiff Spine Specialists of Michigan, PC’s (“Spine Specialists”) claims for no-fault PIP benefits against Defendant MemberSelect Insurance Company (“MemberSelect”).  The Court of Appeals held that the 2019 amendments to the No-Fault Act—specifically, that which added “formal denial” tolling to MCL 500.3145—do not apply retroactively, and that Spine Specialists’ claims, which accrued prior to the effective date of the 2019 amendments and more than one-year prior to the filing date of its complaint, were barred by the applicable, pre-amendment version of MCL 500.3145.

Encompass Healthcare, PLLC v Citizens Ins Co (COA – PUB 11/17/2022; RB #4507)   
In this unanimous, published, decision authored by Judge Gleicher, the Court of Appeals reversed the trial court’s summary disposition order dismissing Plaintiff Encompass Healthcare, PLLC’s (“Encompass”) first-party action seeking unpaid no-fault PIP benefits from Defendant Citizens Insurance Company (“Citizens”). The Court of Appeals held that Citizens’ Explanation of Review (“EOR”) documents—in which it explained that it was issuing only partial payments on Encompass’s claims for allowable expenses PIP benefits—did not constitute “formal denial[s]” of said claims for purposes of MCL 500.3145(3).  In so holding, the Court defined “formal denial” to mean an “explicit and unequivocal expression of finality.”

Whitney v Grange Ins Co of the Midwest (COA – UNP 11/10/2022; RB #4504)   
In this unanimous, unpublished, per curiam decision, the Court of Appeals reversed the trial court’s partial summary disposition order in favor of Plaintiff George Whitney, in Whitney’s action for underinsured motorist coverage against Defendant Grange Insurance Company of Michigan.  The Court of Appeals held that a question of fact existed as to whether Whitney’s alleged impairments were caused by the subject motor vehicle collision.

Nasrallah, et al v Argonaut-Midwest Ins Co (COA – UNP 11/10/2022; RB #4506)
In this unanimous, unpublished, per curiam decision, the Court of Appeals reversed the trial court’s summary disposition order dismissing Plaintiff Back in Motion Chiropractic, DC, PLLC’s (“Back In Motion”) first-party action against Defendant Argonaut-Midwest Insurance Company (“AMIC”). The Court of Appeals held that a question of fact existed as to whether various chiropractic and massage therapy services Back In Motion provided to Mariam Baydoun, AMIC’s insured, were compensable under the relevant provisions of the No-Fault Act.

Bakeman v Citizens Ins Co of the Midwest, et al (COA – PUB 11/10/2022; RB #4503)   
In this unanimous, published, per curiam decision (Jansen, concurring), the Court of Appeals affirmed the trial court’s summary disposition order dismissing Plaintiff Oliver Bakeman’s first-party action for no-fault PIP benefits against Defendant Citizens Insurance Company of the Midwest (“Citizens”).  The Court of Appeals held that Bakeman committed a “fraudulent insurance act” for purposes of MCL 500.3173a(2) (currently MCL 500.3173a(4)), by signing attendant care claim forms which were submitted to Citizens on his behalf, and which claimed reimbursement for more attendant care than he had actually received.

Clark v Suburban Mobility Auth for Regional Transp, et al (COA – UNP 11/10/2022; RB #4505)   
In this unanimous, unpublished, per curiam decision, the Court of Appeals affirmed the trial court’s order granting judgment of an arbitration award in favor of Plaintiff Michael Clark, in Clark’s first-party action for no-fault PIP benefits against Defendant Suburban Mobility Authority for Regional Transportation (“SMART”).  The Court of Appeals held that there was no basis for reversing the trial court’s order because the arbitration award was based on the arbitrator’s factual findings regarding Clark’s claim for PIP benefits, which are not reviewable by courts.

Parraghi v Chodyiecki, et al (COA – UNP 11/3/2022; RB #4502)   
In this unanimous, unpublished, per curiam decision, the Court of Appeals reversed the trial court’s summary disposition order dismissing Plaintiff Dylan Parraghi’s auto negligence action against Defendant Edward Chodyniecki, arising out of a motor vehicle-versus-ORV collision.  The Court of Appeals held, first, that Chodyniecki failed to support his motion for summary disposition on the issue of comparative negligence with admissible documentary evidence.  The Court of Appeals held, second, that even if Chodyniecki had supported his motion with admissible evidence, there was still a question of fact on the issue of comparative negligence.

Epps, et al v United Servs Auto Assoc, et al (COA – UNP 11/3/2022; RB #4501)   
In this unanimous, unpublished, per curiam decision, the Court of Appeals affirmed the trial court’s summary disposition order dismissing Plaintiff Ophelia Epps’s auto negligence action against Defendants Destiny Johnson and Tammy Jones.  At the time of the crash, Epps was a resident of Georgia, had registered her vehicle in Michigan, but had purchased a Georgia auto insurance policy.  The Court of Appeals held that because Epps registered the vehicle in Michigan, she was also required under MCL 500.3101(1) to insure the vehicle with Michigan no-fault insurance pursuant to MCL 500.3101(1).  The Court then held that because Epps failed to maintain the security required by MCL 500.3101(1), she was  barred from recovering damages in tort by MCL 500.3135(2)(c).

Wood v City of Detroit, et al (COA – UNP 11/3/2022; RB #4500)
In this unanimous, unpublished, per curiam decision, the Court of Appeals (on remand from the Supreme Court) affirmed the trial court’s denial of Defendant City of Detroit’s motion for summary disposition, seeking dismissal of Plaintiff Bruce Wood’s auto negligence action against it. The Court of Appeals held that a question of fact existed as to whether James Derrick Pennington, a bus driver for the City of Detroit, was negligent in his operation of a bus that had a tire fly off of it and strike Wood, injuring him. More specifically, the Court of Appeals held that the trial court did not err in refusing to strike Wood’s expert accident reconstructionist’s opinion regarding what Pennington would have felt as he drove a bus without a properly affixed tire.

Baskin v Namer, et al (COA – UNP 10/27/2022; RB #4499)   
In this unanimous, unpublished, per curiam decision, the Court of Appeals reversed the trial court’s summary disposition order dismissing Plaintiff Lamar Baskin’s auto negligence action against Defendant Ali Mahmood-Musaid Namer, but affirmed the trial court’s denial of Namer’s motion for summary disposition on the issue of comparative negligence.  The Court of Appeals held, first, that the trial court erred in ruling, as a matter of law, that Baskin’s injuries were not caused by the subject motor vehicle accident and that Baskin had not suffered an objectively manifested impairment for purposes of MCL 500.3135.  The Court of Appeals held, second, that the trial court did not err in finding that a question of fact remained on the issue of comparative negligence.

Bauer-Rowley, et al v Humphreys, et al (COA – PUB 10/27/2022; RB #4497)   
In this unanimous, published decision authored by Judge Shapiro, the Court of Appeals reversed the trial court’s order awarding attorney fees and costs to Defendant Auto-Owners Insurance Company (“Auto-Owners”) as a sanction against Plaintiff Breanne Bauer-Rowley for filing a frivolous lawsuit.  The Court of Appeals held that, given the facts and circumstances of the case—for instance, the fact that Farm Bureau (ultimately determined to be the highest priority insurer with respect to Bauer-Rowley’s claim for no-fault PIP benefits) initially disputed its priority status, as well as the fact that Bauer-Rowley was explicitly told by the Michigan Automobile Insurance Placement Facility (“MAIPF”) to seek no-fault PIP benefits from Auto-Owners—the trial court clearly erred in finding that Bauer-Rowley’s action against Auto-Owners was frivolous.

Lekli v Farm Bureau Mut Ins Co of Mich, et al (COA – UNP 10/27/2022; RB #4498)   
In this unanimous, unpublished, per curiam decision, the Court of Appeals (on remand from the Supreme Court) reversed the trial court’s summary disposition order dismissing Plaintiff Syrja Lekli’s action against the Michigan Automobile Insurance Placement Facility (“MAIPF”).  The Court of Appeals held that the MAIPF should have assigned Lekli’s claim under MCL 500.3172(1), because, at the time of his application, there was a dispute between Farm Bureau and Great American over which was higher in priority with respect to his claim for no-fault PIP benefits.  Ultimately, it turned out that a different insurer altogether—Hudson Insurance Company (“Hudson”)—was highest in priority, but the Court held that the MAIPF should have assigned Lekli’s claim nonetheless.

Bracy, et al v Nichols, et al (COA – UNP 10/13/2022; RB #4496)   
In this unanimous, unpublished, per curiam decision, the Court of Appeals affirmed the trial court’s summary disposition order dismissing Defendant Farmers Insurance Exchange’s (“Farmers”) crossclaim—seeking reimbursement for no-fault PIP benefits it paid to Plaintiff Beth Bracy—against Co-Defendant Geico Indemnity Company (“Geico”).  Noting that the priority scheme set forth in the former MCL 500.3115(1) applied to this case, the Court of Appeals held that Geico was not in the order of priority for payment of Bracy’s PIP benefits with respect to the subject motor vehicle-versus-pedestrian collision, because while Geico insured the vehicle which crashed into Bracy, the vehicle’s owner, registrant, and operator, Yolanda Nichols, was not a named insured on the policy.

Scott, et al v Mich Auto Ins Placement Facility, et al (COA – UNP 10/13/2022; RB #4495)   
In this unanimous, unpublished, per curiam decision, the Court of Appeals reversed the trial court’s summary disposition order dismissing Plaintiff Orlando Scott’s first-party action for no-fault PIP benefits against Defendant Michigan Automobile Insurance Placement Facility (“MAIPF”).  Relying on Loiola by Fried v Citizens Ins Co of America (On Remand), unpublished per curiam opinion of the Court of Appeals issued December 2, 2021 (Docket No. 348670), the Court of Appeals, in this case, held that Citizens failed to state with particularity its affirmative defense that Scott had committed a “fraudulent insurance act” for purposes of MCL 500.3173a(2). However, as in Loiola, the Court remanded the case to the trial court to allow the MAIPF to amend its affirmative defenses.

Williams v Kelly, et al (COA – UNP 10/13/2022; RB #4494)   
In this unanimous, unpublished, per curiam decision, the Court of Appeals affirmed the trial court’s summary disposition order dismissing Plaintiff Nekeyia Williams auto negligence action against Defendants Christine Antoinette Kelly and the City of Detroit, but reversed the trial court’s summary disposition orders dismissing Williams’s first-party action against the Michigan Automobile Insurance Placement Facility (“MAIPF”).  With respect to Williams’s auto negligence claim against the City of Detroit, the Court held that that claim was properly dismissed because Williams did not plead it under the motor vehicle exception to governmental immunity—she alleged that the City was liable only under theories of owner’s liability, respondeat superior, and negligent hiring and retention.  With respect to Williams’s auto negligence claim against Kelly, a bus driver for the City of Detroit who side-swiped the parked vehicle Williams was sitting in, the Court of Appeals held that there was no evidence that Kelly was grossly negligent in causing the accident.  Lastly, with respect to Williams’s first-party claim against the MAIPF, the Court of Appeals held that there was a question of fact as to whether Williams was a constructive owner of the uninsured vehicle that she was sitting in at the time of the accident, such as would preclude her from collecting no-fault PIP benefits related to her injuries.

Day v Suburban Mobility Auth for Regional Transp, et al (COA – UNP 10/13/2022; RB #4493)   
In this unanimous, unpublished, per curiam decision, the Court of Appeals affirmed the trial court’s denial of Defendant Suburban Mobility Authority for Regional Transportation’s (“SMART”) motion for summary disposition, seeking dismissal of Plaintiff Paula Day’s auto negligence action against it.  The Court of Appeals held that there was sufficient evidence to create a question of fact as to whether a SMART bus driver, Timothy Michael Martin, acted negligently in rear-ending a streetsweeper which was obscured, to some degree, by a cloud of dust it generated.

Surgeons Choice Med Ctr v Everest Nat’l Ins Co, et al (COA – UNP 10/6/2022; RB #4491)   
In this unanimous, unpublished, per curiam decision, the Court of Appeals vacated the trial court’s summary disposition order dismissing Plaintiff Surgeons Choice Medical Center’s (“Surgeon’s Choice”) action for no-fault PIP benefits allegedly owed to its patient/assignor, Tracy Tran, against Defendant Everest National Insurance Company (“Everest”).  Applying its holding in Mecosta Co Med Ctr v Metro Group Prop & Cas Ins Co, ___ Mich ___ (2022), the Court of Appeals held that Surgeons Choice was not bound by judgments against Tran’s other providers in their separate lawsuits against Everest, because (1) Surgeons Choice obtained its assignment from Tran prior to those judgments being rendered, and (2) Surgeons Choice was not in privity with Tran’s other providers.

Stuth v Home-Owners Ins Co, et al (COA – UNP 10/6/2022; RB #4492)   
In this 2-1, unpublished, per curiam decision (Kelly, concurring in part and dissenting in part), the Court of Appeals affirmed in part, and reversed in part, the trial court’s denial of Defendant Home-Owners Insurance Company’s (“Home-Owners”) counterclaim for declaratory relief in Plaintiff John Stuth’s first-party action against it.  The Court of Appeals affirmed the trial court’s finding—following a bench trial—that there was a white van traveling in the opposite direction of Stuth just prior to Stuth losing control of his motorcycle and crashing, but the Court reversed the trial court’s ruling that the white van was involved in Stuth’s crashing for purposes of MCL 500.3105(1).   

Pioneer State Mut Ins Co v McCallister, et al (COA – UNP 9/29/2022; RB #4487)   
In this unanimous, unpublished, per curiam decision, the Court of Appeals reversed the trial court’s summary disposition order in favor of Plaintiff Pioneer State Mutual Insurance Company (“Pioneer”), in Pioneer’s action for declaratory judgment against Defendant Nationwide Mutual Fire & Insurance Company (“Nationwide”).  After the subject motor vehicle accident, in which Tyler McCallister was injured while traveling as a passenger in a vehicle insured by Pioneer, Pioneer rescinded the policy covering the vehicle upon discovering evidence of fraud committed by its insureds.  Pioneer then attempted to deny Tyler McCallister’s claim for no-fault PIP benefits related to the accident, but the Court of Appeals held that the equities weighed against rescission of the policy as to McCallister.

Heade, et al v Liberty Mut Ins Co, et al (COA – UNP 9/29/2022; RB #4489)   
In this unanimous, unpublished, per curiam decision, the Court of Appeals reversed the trial court’s summary disposition order dismissing Plaintiff Jasmine Heade’s first-party action against Defendant Liberty Mutual Insurance Company (“Liberty Mutual”).  The Court of Appeals held, first, that Liberty Mutual was primarily responsible for Jasmine’s medical expenses—not Blue Cross Blue Shield (“BCBSM”), which provided Jasmine with health insurance under a self-funded ERISA plan issued to her father by her father’s employer.  The Court reached its holding based on the fact that both the Liberty Mutual policy and the BCBSM plan contained unambiguous coordination-of-benefits (“COB”) clauses.  In such cases, Michigan caselaw establishes that the no-fault policy is deemed primary.  The Court of Appeals held, second, that Liberty Mutual was entitled to set off Heade’s work loss benefits by both her Social Security Disability Insurance (“SSDI”) benefits and the benefits she received under a disability policy with Sun Life Assurance Company of Canada policy.

Executive Ambulatory Surgical Ctr, et al v Auto Club Ins Assoc (COA – UNP 9/29/2022; RB #4487)  
In this unanimous, unpublished, per curiam decision, the Court of Appeals affirmed the trial court’s denial of Defendant Auto Club Insurance Association’s (“Auto Club”) motion for summary disposition, in which it sought dismissal of Plaintiffs Executive Ambulatory Surgical Center and Premier Orthopedic Group PC’s (“Premier Orthopedic”) first-party action against it.  The Court of Appeals held that Joseph Closser—who was diagnosed with a shoulder injury four years after a motorcycle-versus-motor vehicle accident—gave Auto Club sufficient notice of his shoulder injury within one year of the accident by reporting ‘neck pain’ as one of his early symptoms.

Wolverine Mut Ins Co v Kemper (COA – UNP 9/29/2022; RB #4485) 
In this unanimous, unpublished, per curiam decision, the Court of Appeals affirmed the trial court’s summary disposition order in favor of Plaintiff Wolverine Mutual Insurance Company (“Wolverine”) in Wolverine’s action for declaratory judgment against Defendant Jeffrey Kemper, on the issue of whether injuries Kemper developed after falling out of his car while while attempting to use a transfer board were caused by a 1987 motor vehicle accident which rendered him a quadriplegic.  Relying on McPherson v McPherson, 493 Mich 294 (2013), the Court of Appeals held that Kemper’s injuries did not arise out of the 1987 accident.

Trent v Bristol West Preferred Ins Co, et al (COA – UNP 9/22/2022; RB #4483) 
In this unanimous, unpublished, per curiam decision, the Court of Appeals reversed the trial court’s order granting partial summary disposition to Defendant Bristol West Preferred Insurance Company (“Bristol West”) in Plaintiff Linda Trent’s first-party action against it.  The Court of Appeals held that a question of fact existed as to whether Trent’s injuries were caused by the subject motor vehicle accident, resolution of which was necessary to determine whether Bristol West or Medicaid was responsible for Trent’s medical bills.  If the former, Trent would be entitled to no-fault PIP benefits and, therefore, not “medically indigent” for purposes of Medicaid entitlement, in which case Bristol West would have to pay the reasonable charge for Trent’s treatment pursuant to the No-Fault Act—it would not be allowed to merely reimburse Trent’s providers for the highly discounted amounts they originally accepted from Medicaid.

Epler, et al v Force, et al (COA – UNP 9/22/2022; RB #4482)   
In this unanimous, unpublished, per curiam decision, the Court of Appeals reversed in part, and affirmed in part, the trial court’s order granting partial summary disposition to Defendant Home-Owners Insurance Company (“Home-Owners”) in a lawsuit combining multiple claims for underinsured motorist (“UIM”) coverage arising out of a single car crash.  The Court of Appeals held that two of the plaintiffs, Dennis Pierson and Gerald VanVleet—both of whom were traveling as passengers in a vehicle driven by Lloyd Pierson at the time of the crash—were entitled to UIM coverage under Lloyd’s Home-Owners policy and their own Home-Owners policies—all of which had UIM limits of $250,000 per person/$500,000 per occurrence—because their own policies contained “excess” other-insurance clauses, making UIM coverage under those policies excess over Lloyd’s.  The Court of Appeals held, second, that given the language of the “excess” other-insurance clauses, the tortfeasor’s individual policy limits should be subtracted both from the coverage available to Dennis Pierson and VanVleet under Lloyd’s policy, as well as the coverage available to them under their own policies.  

Williamson, et al v AAA of Michigan (COA – PUB 9/22/2022; RB #4476) 
In this unanimous, published decision authored by Judge Garrett, the Court of Appeals reversed the trial court’s summary disposition order dismissing Plaintiff Estate of Charles Williamson’s first-party action against Defendant AAA of Michigan (“AAA”).  The Court of Appeals held that AAA could not deny a claim assigned to it by the Michigan Automobile Insurance Placement Facility (MAIPF) based on fraudulent statement offered during litigation, because the term ‘fraudulent insurance act’ in MCL 500.3173a “applies only to statements offered during the prelitigation insurance claims process and not to those offered during litigation.”  The specific fraudulent statement(s) at issue were actually replacement service and attendant care forms produced in response to a AAA discovery request.  The Court held that these forms were not ‘claims’ for no-fault PIP benefits, as that term is understood in MCL 500.3173a.  Rather, the ‘claim’ for purposes of MCL 500.3173a was only Williamson’s initial demand for PIP coverage.

Malone v McRell, et al (COA – UNP 9/22/2022; RB #4481)   
In this unanimous, unpublished, per curiam decision, the Court of Appeals affirmed the trial court’s summary disposition order dismissing Plaintiff Heather Malone’s auto negligence action against Defendant Zhetman Brighton, LC (“Zhetman”).  The Court of Appeals held that Malone could not proceed with her action against Zhetman—the employer of Conor McRell, who rear-ended Malone while delivering a pizza—because she entered into a settlement agreement releasing her claims against McRell.  Since Zhetman was only vicariously liable for Malone’s injuries, a release of her claims against McRell operated as a release of her claims against Zhetman, as well.

White v Richardson, et al (COA – UNP 9/22/2022; RB #4479)   
In this unanimous, unpublished, per curiam decision, the Court of Appeals affirmed the trial court’s summary disposition order dismissing Plaintiff Jonnie White’s action for uninsured or underinsured motorist (“UM/UIM”) coverage against Defendant Country Preferred Insurance Company (“Country Preferred”).  The Court of Appeals held that a policy provision establishing a two-year limitations period for filing an action for UM/UIM coverage thereunder was valid and enforceable, because Illinois law was controlling in this case.  Alternatively, the Court held that if Michigan law was controlling in this case, the shortened limitations period would still be enforceable because such provisions only run afoul of Michigan public policy where the contract in question is issued to a Michigan resident.  In this case, the Country Preferred policy was issued to an Illinois resident.

Gueye v State Farm Mut Auto Ins Co, et al (COA – PUB 9/22/2022; RB #4477) 
In this unanimous, published decision authored by Judge Garrett, the Court of Appeals affirmed the trial court’s summary disposition order dismissing Plaintiff Malick Gueye’s action for UM/UIM coverage against Defendant State Farm Mutual Automobile Insurance Company (“State Farm”), but remanded for determination of whether the dismissal should be deemed with or without prejudice.  The Court of Appeals also reversed the trial court’s summary disposition order dismissing Gueye’s first-party action for no-fault PIP benefits against State Farm, remanding for further proceedings consistent with its opinion.  As to Geuye’s claim for UM/UIM coverage, the Court held that Gueye was barred from filing suit for said coverage because of a provision in his policy which required that he submit to a requested insurance medical examination (“IME”) or examination under oath (“EUO”) prior to filing his complaint.  State Farm requested that he undergo both numerous times pre-suit, but Gueye failed to cooperate.  As to Gueye’s claim for no-fault PIP benefits, however, the Court of Appeals held that the trial court erred by imposing the most severe sanction under MCL 500.3153 based entirely on its “simply yes-or-no finding that [Gueye] did not attend an IME.”  Dismissal of a no-fault claim in its entirety is but one order a trial court is permitted to enter under MCL 500.3153 as a sanction for failing to comply with a valid IME request.  Before entering that most drastic sanction, however, the court must first weigh the applicable factors set forth in Vicencio v Ramirez, 211 Mich App 501 (1995), which dealt with the appropriateness of dismissal based on discovery violatons during litigation.

Flowers v Wilson, et al (COA – UNP 9/22/2022; RB #4478)   
In this unanimous, unpublished, per curiam decision (Swartzle, concurring), the Court of Appeals reversed the trial court’s denial of Defendant Auto Club Insurance Association’s motion for summary disposition, in which it sought dismissal of Plaintiff Tynina Flowers’s first-party action against it.  The Court of Appeals held that Flowers could not sue Auto Club for her leftover balance with her medical providers—after Auto Club paid only the portions of the providers’ charges which it (unilaterally) deemed “reasonable”—because Auto Club promised to indemnify and defend Flowers if her providers sued her for the balance in the future.

Nelson v Owusu, et al (COA – UNP 9/15/2022; RB #4475)   
Plaintiff Latasha Nelson’s first-party action against Defendant Progressive Michigan Insurance Company (“Progressive”) and third-party auto negligence action against Defendant Kwadwo Owusu.  With respect to Nelson’s first-party action, the Court of Appeals held that the trial court made an improper credibility determination in deciding Progressive’s motion for summary disposition.  Specifically, in ruling that the equities weighed in favor of denying Nelson’s claim for no-fault PIP benefits related to the subject motor vehicle accident under a now-rescinded policy issued to her then-boyfriend, Christopher Johnstone, the trial court found that Nelson’s claimed ignorance of a misrepresentation Johnstone made to Progressive regarding the two’s living arrangement was not believable.  With respect to Nelson’s auto negligence action against Owusu, the Court of Appeals held that rescission of a policy, ab initio, is a remedy in contract and does not actually change the past for purposes of MCL 500.3135(2)(c), such as would render Nelson retroactively uninsured at the time of the accident.  

Garden City Rehab, LLC v Integon Nat’l Ins Co (COA – UNP 9/15/2022; RB #4474)
In this unanimous, unpublished, per curiam decision, the Court of Appeals affirmed the trial court’s summary disposition order dismissing Plaintiff Garden City Rehab, LLC’s (“Garden City Rehab” or “Garden City”) first-party action against Defendant Integon National Insurance Company (“Integon”).  The Court of Appeals held that Garden City Rehab failed to present sufficient evidence to create a question of fact as to whether Montana Sams, its patient assignor/Integon’s insured, was injured as a result of the subject motor vehicle accident for purposes of MCL 500.3105.

Cavill v Mich State Police, et al (COA – UNP 9/15/2022; RB #4473)   
In this 2-1, unpublished, per curiam decision (Murray, concurring in part, dissenting in part), the Court of Appeals affirmed the trial court’s denial of Defendant State of Michigan’s (“the State”) motion for summary disposition, seeking dismissal of Plaintiff Martha Cavill’s auto negligence action against it.  The Court of Appeals held that Cavill complied with MCL 600.6431(2)(d)’s requirement that a notice of intention to file a claim against the State contain ‘[a] signature and verification by the claimant before an officer authorized to administer oaths,’ by signing her notice of intent and having her signature notarized by a notary public.  MCL 600.6431(2)(d) does not require—as the State argued—that verification be in the form set forth in MCR 1.109(D)(3).

MemberSelect Ins Co v Hartford Accident & Indemnity Co (COA – PUB 9/15/2022; RB #4472)   
In this unanimous, published, per curiam decision, the Court of Appeals reversed the trial court’s summary disposition order dismissing Plaintiff MemberSelect Insurance Company’s (“MemberSelect”) first-party action for reimbursement against Defendant Hartford Accident & Indemnity Company’s (“Hartford”).  The Court of Appeals held that Michael McGilligan, who was insured under a commercial auto insurance policy he purchased from Hartford, was entitled to no-fault PIP benefits from Hartford even though the policy purported to exclude PIP coverage for accidents not involving a “covered auto.”  Hartford could not, to quote the Court, “limit its extension of PIP coverage in a manner inconsistent with [MCL 500.3114(1)].”

Childers, et al v Progressive Marathon Ins Co (COA – PUB 9/15/2022; RB #4471)   
In this unanimous, published decision authored by Judge Yates, the Court of Appeals reversed the trial court’s summary disposition order dismissing Plaintiffs Justin Childers and the Michigan Property & Casualty Guaranty Association’s (“MPCGA”) action against Defendant Progressive Marathon Insurance Company (“Progressive”).  The Court of Appeals held, first, that the one-year-notice rule does not apply to actions commenced by either no-fault claimants or the MPCGA against lower priority insurers after a higher priority insurer becomes insolvent.  Instead, such claims are subject either to a one-year limitations period which begins to run from the date of insolvency, or the default six-year limitations period set forth in MCL 600.5813 (the Court did not officially decide which was proper, noting only that the plaintiffs’ suit was timely under both).  The Court of Appeals held, second, that Shaina Groulx, the driver and owner of the vehicle Childers was traveling in at the time of the subject motor vehicle accident, was an “insured” under a Progressive policy issued to her brother, with whom she lived at the time.  As a result, Progressive was the highest priority insurer under the version of MCL 500.3114(4) in effect on the date of the accident, August 6, 2011 (before entitlement for “domiciled relatives” was created).

Garden City Rehab, LLC v Integon Nat’l Ins Co (COA – UNP 9/15/2022; RB #4474)
In this unanimous, unpublished, per curiam decision, the Court of Appeals affirmed the trial court’s summary disposition order dismissing Plaintiff Garden City Rehab, LLC’s (“Garden City Rehab” or “Garden City”) first-party action against Defendant Integon National Insurance Company (“Integon”).  The Court of Appeals held that Garden City Rehab failed to present sufficient evidence to create a question of fact as to whether Montana Sams, its patient assignor/Integon’s insured, was injured as a result of the subject motor vehicle accident for purposes of MCL 500.3105.

Perkins v Suburban Mobility Auth for Regional Transp (COA – UNP 9/1/2022; RB #4470)   
In this unanimous, unpublished, per curiam decision, the Court of Appeals affirmed the trial court’s denial of Defendant Suburban Mobility Authority for Regional Transportation’s (“SMART”) motion or summary disposition seeking dismissal of certain of Plaintiff David Perkins’s claims for no-fault PIP benefits.  The Court of Appeals held that Perkins and two of his providers, Renew Physical Therapy (“Renew”) and Farmbrook Interventional Pain & EMG (“Farmbrook”), could mutually rescind an assignment Perkins executed in favor of Renew and Farmbrook, such as to allow Perkins to pursue the formerly assigned benefits in the underlying action.  Notably, the Court of Appeals reached this holding despite the fact that Renew and Farmbrook would have been precluded from pursuing the assigned benefits in a separate action of their own because of the one-year-back rule.

Andary, et al v USAA Cas Ins Co (COA – PUB 8/25/2022; RB #4469)   
In this 2-1, published decision authored by the Judge Shapiro (Markey, dissenting), the Court of Appeals reversed the trial court’s summary disposition order dismissing Plaintiffs Ellen Andary and Philip Krueger’s first-party actions against Defendants USAA Casualty Insurance Company (“USAA”) and Citizens Insurance Company of America (“Citizens”).  The Court of Appeals held that the 2019 amendments to Michigan’s no-fault act—specifically, MCL 500.3157(7), which caps medical provider reimbursement for medical services not covered by Medicare at 55 percent of what the provider charged on January 1, 2019, and MCL 500.3157(10), which limits the amount of “family-provided” attendant care that an injured person can receive to 56 hours per week—cannot be applied retroactively to persons who injured prior to the amendments’ enactment, June 11, 2019.  Alternatively, the Court of Appeals held that, even if the Legislature had demonstrated retroactive intent in the 2019 amendments, the amendments could not be applied to no-fault insureds such as the plaintiffs in this case, because to do so would substantially impair contracts they entered into with their insurance companies, in violation of the Contracts Clause of the Michigan Constitution.