Injured? Contact Sinas Dramis for a free consultation.

   

Welcome to the Michigan Auto No-Fault Law Digital Library

The Michigan No-Fault Act was adopted in 1973, and since then, there have been over 4000 Michigan appellate court opinions regarding the law. Sinas Dramis Law Firm has written case summaries regarding virtually all these opinions and continues to do so at the present time. The Michigan Auto No-Fault Law Digital Library is a compilation of all the case summaries from Sinas Dramis Law Firm. The case summaries are freely provided to further our goal of educating the public about the Michigan Auto No-Fault Law.

The Digital Library is fully searchable. Therefore, searching by case name or relevant terms is a good way to find the case summary and opinion. There is also an indexing system that allows you to find a case through a statutory indextopical indexalphabetical index, or chronological index.


To make it easy for the public to understand the latest developments in the law, the recent case summaries are listed below.

Recent Cases

Collier v Montalvo, et al (COA – UNP 9/23/2021; RB #4321)
In this unanimous unpublished per curiam decision, the Court of Appeals affirmed a judgment of no cause of action entered after a jury trial in Plaintiff Vicki Collier’s third-party action against Defendant Lindsay Montalvo. The Court of Appeals held that the trial court did not err in denying Collier’s motion for a directed verdict and JNOV because, given Collier’s and Montalvo’s conflicting accounts of how the crash happened, there was a question of fact as to whether Montalvo was operating her vehicle negligently at the time of the crash.

Auto Club Ins Assoc/MemberSelect Ins Co v Farm Bureau General Ins Co of Mich, et al (COA – UNP 9/23/2021; RB #4321)
In this unanimous unpublished per curiam decision, the Court of Appeals reversed the trial court’s summary disposition order, in which the trial court dismissed Plaintiff Auto Club Insurance Association/MemberSelect Insurance Company’s (“Auto Club”) action against Defendant Farm Bureau General Insurance Company of Michigan (“Farm Bureau”) arising out of a priority dispute.  The Court of Appeals held that Auto Club and Farm Bureau were equal in priority for payment of Sabreen Shamoon’s no-fault PIP benefits, and that Auto Club was therefore entitled to partial recoupment of the benefits it paid to Shamoon pursuant to MCL 500.3115(2).  Furthermore, the Court of Appeals held that actions for partial recoupment under MCL 500.3115(2) are not subject to the one-year-back rule as are subrogation actions, but are rather subject to the six-year limitations period set forth in MCL 600.5813.

Downs, et al v State Farm Mutual Automobile Insurance Company, et al (COA – UNP 9/23/2021; RB #4320)     
In this unanimous unpublished per curiam decision, the Court of Appeals reversed the trial court’s denial of Defendant State Farm Mutual Automobile Insurance Company’s (“State Farm”) motion for summary disposition seeking dismissal of Intervenor-Plaintiffs Renaissace Chirporactic, PC (“Renaissance”), Centrium Physical Therapy PC (“Centrium”), and Core Healing Body Works, LLC’s (“Core Healing”) action against it, in which the intervenor-plaintiffs sought reimbursement for the treatments they provided to State Farm’s insured, Erika Tyler, after Tyler was injured in a motor vehicle collision.  The intervenor-plaintiffs sought reimbursement under a theory of unjust enrichment, but the Court of Appeals held that their lawsuit was merely a first-party action governed by the no-fault act, and that they could not invoke the doctrine of unjust enrichment in order to obtain unpaid PIP benefits from State Farm. 

Yang v Everest Nat’l Ins Co, et al (MSC – PUB; 06/10/2021; RB #4319) 
In this unanimous opinion by Justice Bernstein, the Supreme Court held that “under MCL 500.3020(1)(b), a cancellation notice is effective only if it is peremptory, explicit, and unconditional. The Court then concluded that a cancellation letter by Everest National was ineffective “because Everest’s letter provided that cancellation was conditioned upon Yang’s failure to pay his insurance premiums.

Estate of Ballentine v Salvaggio, et al (COA – UNP 9/16/2021; RB #4318)   
In this unanimous unpublished per curiam decision, the Court of Appeals affirmed the trial court’s summary disposition order dismissing Plaintiff Estate of Mark Ballentine’s third-party lawsuit against Defendants Robert Salvaggio, National Mini Storage-KL Avenue, and U-Haul Company of Michigan (“Salvaggio,” “National,” and “U-Haul, individually; “defendants,” collectively).  Salvaggio, an employee of National, arrived to work and attempted to park a U-Haul vehicle that had been left outside the gate to the parking lot.  In the process, he accidentally ran over Ballentine, who was intoxicated and laying underneath the vehicle.  The Court of Appeals held that Salvaggio did not breach his duty to exercise ordinary care in his operation of the U-Haul by not looking underneath the vehicle before moving it.

Eagle, et al v Macomb Intermediate School Dist, et al (COA – UNP 9/2/2021; RB #4317)   
In this unanimous unpublished per curiam decision, the Court of Appeals affirmed in part and reversed in part the trial court’s summary disposition order dismissing Plaintiff William Eagle’s third-party action against Defendant Macomb Intermediate School District (“MISD”).  The Court of Appeals held that the motor vehicle exception to governmental immunity applied to this case because Eagle presented sufficient evidence to create a question of fact as to whether he suffered a shoulder injury in the subject school bus versus motor vehicle crash caused by the negligence of MISD’s bus driver.  The Court also held, however, that Eagle failed to present sufficient evidence to create a question of fact as to whether he suffered a brain injury in the crash.

Smith, et al v City of Detroit, et al (COA – UNP 9/2/2021; RB #4316)
In this unanimous unpublished per curiam decision, the Court of Appeals reversed the trial court’s summary disposition order dismissing Plaintiff Jeanine D. Smith’s first-party action against Defendant City of Detroit, as well as Smith’s third-party action against Defendants Elliott Baum and Natalie Baum. Regarding Smith’s first-party action against the City of Detroit, the Court of Appeals held that Smith presented sufficient evidence to create a question of fact as to whether she suffered an accidental bodily injury in the subject crash for purposes of no-fault PIP benefit entitlement under MCL 500.3105(1). Regarding Smith’s third-party action against the Baums, the Court of Appeals held that Smith presented sufficient evidence to create a question of fact as to whether the subject crash caused her to suffer a serious impairment of body function.

Toduti, et al v Progressive Mich Ins Co, et al (UNP– COA 9/2/2021; RB #4315)
In this unanimous unpublished per curiam decision, the Court of Appeals affirmed the trial court’s summary disposition order in favor of Defendant Progressive Michigan Insurance Company (“Progressive”), in which the trial court ruled that Defendant Cherokee Insurance Company (“Cherokee”) was the highest priority insurer with respect to Plaintiff Florin Toduti’s claim for no-fault PIP benefits. The Court of Appeals held that, based on the “economic reality test,” Toduti was actually an employee, not an independent contractor, of Universal, Mason & Dixon Intermodal (“Universal), the company which leased and insured the semi-truck Toduti owned and was driving in the course and scope of his duties under his contract with Universal at the time of the subject collision. The Court of Appeals further held that, because of the terms of its long-term lease agreement regarding the truck, Universal was an “owner” of the semi-truck pursuant to MCL 500.3101(2)(h), and, therefore, under MCL 500.3114(3), Univeral’s insurer, Cherokee, was the highest priority insurer for Toduti’s claims for benefits.

Mich Head & Spine Institute v Auto-Owners Ins Co, et al (PUB– COA 9/2/2021; RB #4314)
In this majority published decision authored by Justice Kelly (Riordan, dissenting), the Court of Appeals reversed the trial court’s summary disposition order dismissing Plaintiff Michigan Head & Spine Institute PC’s (“Michigan Head & Spine”) first-party action against Defendants Auto-Owners Insurance Company and Home-Owners Insurance Company (“defendants,” collectively). The Court of Appeals held that Michigan Head & Spine could aggregate 39 unrelated claims for unpaid no-fault PIP benefits in order to meet the jurisdictional threshold of $25,000 for Michigan circuit courts.

Bronson Health Care Group, Inc, et al v State Farm Fire and Cas Co, et al (UNP – COA 8/26/2021; RB #4313)
In this unanimous unpublished per curiam decision, the Court of Appeals reversed the trial court’s summary disposition order dismissing Plaintiff Bronson Health Care Group, Inc.’s (“Bronson”) first-party action against Defendant State Farm Fire and Casualty Company (“State Farm”). The Court of Appeals held that a question of fact existed as to whether State Farm complied with MCL 500.3020(1)(b) in cancelling its insured’s—Bronson’s patient’s—automobile insurance policy, under which Bronson sought no-fault PIP benefits on the basis of an assignment. Specifically, the Court of Appeals held that a question of fact existed as to whether State Farm mailed written notice of cancellation to the insured’s address last known to it.

Estate of Johnson v Progressive Marathon Ins Co (UNP – COA 8/26/2021; RB #4312)
In this unanimous unpublished per curiam decision, the Court of Appeals affirmed the trial court’s denial of Defendant Progressive Marathon Insurance Company’s (“Progressive”) motion for summary disposition, in which Progressive sought dismissal of Plaintiff Estate of Derell Darnell Johnson’s (“the Estate”) first-party action against it. The Court of Appeals held that Progressive failed to conclusively prove that its insureds, Tomeka Roche Lewis and Brandon Lawrence Byers—under whose policy the Estate sought PIP benefits after Johnson was killed in the subject motor vehicle collision—committed fraud, thereby entitling State Farm to rescind their policy and deny the Estate’s claim for PIP benefits under it.

Nickerson v Allstate Ins Co (UNP – COA 8/26/2021; RB #4311)
In this unanimous unpublished per curiam decision, the Court of Appeals affirmed the trial court’s denial of Defendant Allstate Insurance Company’s (“Allstate”) motion for summary disposition, in which Allstate sought dismissal of Plaintiff Tracey Nickerson’s first-party action against it, as well as the trial court’s denial of Nickerson’s post-trial motion for attorney fees. In denying Allstate’s motion for summary disposition, the Court of Appeals held that a question of fact existed as to whether Nickerson had committed a fraudulent insurance act for purposes of MCL 500.3172, and whether, therefore, her claim for no-fault PIP benefits was barred in its entirety. In denying Nickerson’s post-trial motion for attorney fees, the Court of Appeals held that, based on the specific facts and circumstances of this case, Nickerson failed to file her motion within a “reasonable time.”

Chivis v Cass County Public Transit, et al (UNP – COA 8/26/2021; RB #4310)
In this unanimous unpublished per curiam decision, the Court of Appeals reversed the trial court’s summary disposition order dismissing Plaintiff Nadageki Chivis’s third-party action against Defendant Cass County Public Transit (“CCPT”). The Court of Appeals held that Chivis presented sufficient evidence to create a question of fact as to whether CCPT’s bus driver, Linetta Smith, was operating the subject CCPT bus negligently when she ran over Chivis in the road, and whether, therefore, the CCPT could be held liable under the motor vehicle exception to governmental immunity, MCL 691.1405.

Estate of Ousley v Phelps Towing, Inc (UNP – COA 8/26/2021; RB #4309)
In this unanimous unpublished per curiam decision, the Court of Appeals affirmed the trial court’s summary disposition order dismissing Plaintiff Estate of Oscar Ousley’s third-party action against Defendant Phelps Towing, Incorporated (“Phelps”). The Court of Appeals held that the Estate failed to present any evidence that Phelps’s tow truck driver acted negligently when he accidentally ran over the Estate’s decedent.

Humphrey v Home-Owners Ins Co (UNP – COA 8/19/2021; RB #4308)
In this unanimous unpublished per curiam decision, the Court of Appeals reversed the trial court’s summary disposition order dismissing Plaintiff Adaseny Humphrey’s first-party action against Defendant Home-Owners Insurance Company (“Home-Owners”) on the basis of fraudulent statements Humphrey made at her deposition. Relying on Haydaw v Farm Bureau Ins Co, 332 Mich App 719 (2020), the Court of Appeals held that Home-Owners could not deny Humphrey’s claim for no-fault PIP benefits under her mother’s policy based on false statements Humphrey made after litigation had begun. Notably, the Court of Appeals explained that it was reaching this holding even though, in this case, Home-Owners was relying on a common law fraud defense, as opposed to a fraud-exclusion defense like that which was at issue in Haydaw. In so explaining, the Court iterated “the basic principle—that statements made during litigation are not made with the intent that the insurer will rely upon them—applies equally to both fraud-based defenses.”

Balsamo v Corrigan Enterprises, Inc, et al (UNP – COA 8/19/2021; RB #4307)
In this unanimous unpublished per curiam decision, the Court of Appeals reversed the trial court’s denial of Defendants Corrigan Enterprises, Inc. (“Corrigan”) and Justin Prall’s motion for summary disposition, in which they argued that the no-fault act—MCL 500.3135, specifically—applied to Plaintiff Guiseppe Balsamo’s lawsuit, which arose out of an injury Balsamo sustained while unloading construction equipment from a trailer. The Court of Appeals held that Balsamo’s lawsuit was, in fact, a third-party tort case under MCL 500.3135(1), not a general negligence action.

Rokosz v Labean, et al (UNP – COA 8/19/2021; RB #4306)
In this unanimous unpublished per curiam decision, the Court of Appeals reversed the trial court’s summary disposition order dismissing Plaintiff Sheila Ann Rokosz third-party action against Defendants Derek Joseph Labean, Donald Labean, and Dawn Labean. The Court of Appeals held that Rokosz presented sufficient evidence to create a question of fact as to whether her injuries were caused by the subject collision and whether they constituted a serious impairment of body function pursuant to McCormick v Carrier, 487 Mich 180 (2010).

Lekli v Hudson Ins Co (UNP – COA 8/19/2021; RB #4305)
In this unanimous unpublished per curiam decision, the Court of Appeals affirmed the trial court’s summary disposition order dismissing Plaintiff Syrja Lekli’s first-party action against Hudson Insurance Company (“Hudson”). The Court of Appeals held that Lekli’s action was barred by MCL 500.3145(1) because she neither filed her action within one year of the subject collision nor properly notified Hudson of her injuries within one year of the collision.

Sierra-Burkes v Troy Aggregate Carriers, Inc, et al (UNP – COA 8/12/2021; RB #4304)
In this unanimous unpublished per curiam decision, the Court of Appeals affirmed the trial court’s summary disposition order dismissing Plaintiff Blanca Sierra-Burkes's third-party action against Defendant Troy Aggregate Carriers, Incorporated (“Troy”). The Court of Appeals held that Sierra-Burkes failed to present sufficient evidence to create a question of fact as to whether she suffered an objectively manifested impairment caused by the alleged incident.

Wood v City of Detroit, et al (UNP – COA 8/12/2021; RB #4303)
In this unanimous unpublished per curiam decision, the Court of Appeals affirmed the trial court’s denial of the defendants’—the City of Detroit and seventeen mechanics employed by it— motion for summary disposition, in which they sought dismissal of Plaintiff Bruce T. Wood’s third-party action against them. This case was before the Court of Appeals for the second time; the first time, the Court held that a question of fact existed as to whether the motor vehicle exception to governmental immunity applied, basing its holding, at least in part, on an affidavit from an accident reconstructionist who opined that the City of Detroit’s bus driver’s negligence caused Wood’s injuries. This time around, the Court of Appeals held that the law-of-the-case doctrine applied and affirmed the Wood I Court’s ruling regarding the accident reconstructionist’s affidavit. The Court of Appeals next held that Wood’s count in his complaint—in which he alleged that the City of Detroit was vicariously liable for its bus driver’s negligence pursuant to the doctrine of respondeat superior—was sufficient for purposes of the statutory motor vehicle exception to governmental immunity. Lastly, the Court of Appeals held that the trial court correctly ruled that a sanction for spoliation was appropriate given the defendants’ failure to maintain the maintenance logs for the bus on the date in question, but that the trial court should have determined whether that evidence was ever within the control of the defendants and could have been preserved by the defendants.

Losinski v Carter, Jr, et al (UNP – COA 7/29/2021; RB #4302)
In this 2-1 unpublished per curiam decision (Gleicher, concurring in part and dissenting in part), the Court of Appeals affirmed the trial court’s summary disposition order dismissing Plaintiff Amy G. Losinski’s first-party action against Progressive Marathon Insurance Company. The majority held that Progressive was entitled to deny Losinski’s claim for no-fault PIP benefits after she was injured in a motor vehicle collision because of a “preprocurement innocent misrepresentation” Losinski made when she renewed her policy with Progressive. Specifically, the majority held that Losinski committed fraud when she renewed her policy without first disclosing to Progressive that she no longer lived at the address she listed on her original application for insurance. The majority squared its holding with the Supreme Court’s holding in Meemic Ins Co v Fortson, 506 Mich 287 (2020), reasoning that, every time Losinski renewed her policy, a new, distinct policy was formed, and thus, every time she renewed her policy, she was inducing Progressive to offer her a new contract. Therefore, her misrepresentation at renewal, according to the majority, “ ‘related to the inducement or inception of the contract’ ” pursuant to Meemic. Justice Gleicher, in her dissent, argued that Losinski’s alleged fraud at renewal “could not possibly” be construed as a “misrepresentation in the inducement of the insurance contract,” because “an automatic renewal . . . is not equivalent to the formation of a contract.” Furthermore, Justice Gleicher argued that the majority’s holding would invite “insurers to play the renewal card whenever a misrepresentation is alleged,” thereby sidestepping Meemic.

Garza v Reiche, et al (UNP – COA 7/29/2021; RB #4301)
In this unanimous unpublished per curiam decision, the Court of Appeals reversed the trial court’s summary disposition order dismissing Plaintiff Sharr Garza’s third-party automobile negligence action Defendant Chase Willard Reiche. The Court of Appeals held that the doctrine of judicial estoppel did not bar Garza’s action even though she failed to disclose her negligence claim on her first two amendments to her asset schedule in a separate bankruptcy proceeding.

Greater Lakes Ambulatory Surgical Center, LLC, et al v Meemic Ins Co (UNP – COA 7/29/2021; RB #4300)
In this unanimous unpublished per curiam decision, the Court of Appeals reversed the trial court’s denial of Defendant Meemic Insurance Company’s (“Meemic”) motion for summary disposition in which Meemic sought dismissal of Plaintiff Greater Lakes Ambulatory Surgical Center, LLC’s (“Greater Lakes”) first-party action against Meemic and remanded for entry of an order granting summary disposition to Meemic. The Court of Appeals held that Greater Lakes could not proceed with its first-party action against Meemic—which it filed after obtaining an assignment from its patient/Meemic’s insured—because Greater Lakes sold the patient’s account receivable to a servicing agency while the action was still pending. As a result, Greater Lakes was no longer the real party in interest in the case, and no longer had standing to pursue its first-party claim against Meemic.

Esurance Prop & Cas Ins Co v Mich Assigned Claims Plan, et al (SC – PUB  7/26/2021; RB #4299)
In this 5-2 published decision (Clement and Viviano, dissenting), authored by Justice Zahra, the Michigan Supreme Court reversed the Court of Appeals’ affirmance of the trial court’s summary disposition order dismissing Plaintiff Esurance Property & Casualty Insurance Company’s (“Esurance”) equitable subrogation action against Defendant Michigan Assigned Claims Plan (“MACP”). The Supreme Court held that Esurance could seek reimbursement from the MACP under a theory of equitable subrogation—for no-fault PIP benefits it paid to Roshaun Edwards for medical treatment Edwards received after he was injured in a motor vehicle collision—because Esurance was neither in the order of priority for paying Edward’s PIP benefits, nor acting as a “mere volunteer” when it promptly, but mistakenly, paid those benefits.

Vibra of Southeastern Mich, LLC v Auto-Owners Ins Co, et al (UNP – COA 7/22/2021; RB #4298)
In this 2-1 unpublished per curiam decision (Riordan, dissenting), the Court of Appeals affirmed the trial court’s denial of Defendant Auto-Owners Insurance Company’s (“Auto-Owners”) motion for summary disposition, as well as its order granting Plaintiff Vibra of Southeastern Mich, LLC’s (“Vibra”) motion for summary disposition. Specifically, the Court of Appeals affirmed the trial court’s ruling that Randall Baran, Vibra’s patient and Auto-Owners’ insured, was entitled to no-fault PIP benefits for injuries he sustained when the rear liftgate fell on his head as he unloaded items from his vehicle. The Court of Appeals held that Baran was entitled to no-fault PIP benefits under the parked-vehicle exception set forth in MCL 500.3106(1)(b), because his injuries were the direct result of physical contact with the property he was unloading from the vehicle’s trunk at the moment the rear liftgate fell on his head.

Spectrum Health Hosps, et al v Farm Bureau Gen Ins Co of Mich, et al (UNP – COA 7/22/2021; RB #4297)
In this unanimous unpublished per curiam decision, the Court of Appeals affirmed the trial court’s denial of Defendant Farm Bureau General Insurance Company of Michigan’s (“Farm Bureau”) motion for summary disposition, in which Farm Bureau sought dismissal of Plaintiff Spectrum Health Hospitals’ (“Spectrum”) first-party action against it. As to Farm Bureau’s motion for summary disposition, the Court of Appeals held that Spectrum obtained valid assignments from its patient/Farm Bureau’s insured, Kevin Schild, after Schild was injured in a motor vehicle collision, and therefore had standing to pursue its first-party action against Farm Bureau. As to Spectrum’s motion for attorney fees, the Court of Appeals held that the trial court did not err in denying that motion because Farm Bureau’s denial of Spectrum’s claims for no-fault PIP benefits was based on legitimate questions regarding the reasonableness of Spectrum’s charges, and therefore not an unreasonable denial for purposes of MCL 500.3148(1).

Estate of Jacobson, et al v Hornbeck,et al (COA - UNP 7/22/2021; RB #4296)
In this unanimous unpublished per curiam decision, the Court of Appeals reversed the trial court’s denial of Defendants Matthew Hornbeck and Samuel Bradley’s motion for summary disposition seeking dismissal of Plaintiff Estate of Lake Jacobson’s (“Plaintiff”) third-party claim against them, then affirmed in part and vacated in part the trial court’s denial of Defendant Sakstrup Towing, Inc.’s (“Sakstrup”) motion for summary disposition regarding Plaintiff’s third-party claim against it. The Court of Appeals first held that the public-duty doctrine shielded Hornbeck and Bradley, who were police officers, from liability for choosing not to detain an intoxicated driver who, after crashing his car into a culvert and being questioned by Hornbeck and Bradley, was allowed to get back in his car and drive off, immediately after which he crossed into oncoming traffic and crashed into Lake Jacobson’s vehicle, killing Jacobson instantly. The Court of Appeals then vacated the trial court’s denial of Sakstrup’s motion for summary disposition because the trial court did not employ the proper test for determining whether Sakstrup’s tow-truck employee owed a duty to Plaintiff’s decedent to adequately inspect the intoxicated driver’s crashed vehicle for disabling damage before towing it out of the culvert and to prevent the intoxicated driver from driving off in a disabled vehicle. Lastly, the Court of Appeals upheld the trial court’s ruling that judicial estoppel did not apply to bar the Plaintiff’s claim against Sakstrup because the trial court’s finding that genuine issues of material fact existed as to whether Hornbeck and Bradley were the proximate cause of Plaintiff’s decedent’s injuries “was not a finding that the officers ‘were the proximate cause.’ (emphasis added)”

Jagannathan Neurosurgical Institute, PLLC, et al v GEICO Indemnity Co, et al (COA – UNP 7/15/2021; RB #4294)
In this unanimous unpublished per curiam decision, the Court of Appeals affirmed the trial court’s summary disposition order dismissing Plaintiff Jagannathan Neurosurgical Institute, PLLC’s (“Jagannathan”) first-party action to recover no-fault PIP benefits from Defendants GEICO Indemnity Company and GEICO General Insurance Company (“GEICO,” collectively). The Court of Appeals held that Jagannathan’s patient was not an out-of-state resident at the time of the subject collision for purposes of the former MCL 500.3163, and that Jagannathan, therefore, could not recover PIP benefits on the basis of an assignment from GEICO—an authorized Michigan insurer for purposes of MCL 500.3163—under whose Florida automobile insurance policy Jagannathan’s patient was insured at the time of the collision.

Yaghnam v Doe, et al (COA – UNP 7/15/2021; RB #4293)
In this unanimous unpublished per curiam decision, the Court of Appeals affirmed the trial court’s summary disposition order dismissing Plaintiff Elias Yaghnam’s action for uninsured/underinsured benefits against Defendant Michigan Insurance Company (“MIC”). The Court of Appeals held that Yaghnam’s claim for UM/UIM was a standard personal injury action, not a breach of contract action. Therefore, the applicable statute of limitations was three years—pursuant to MCL 600.5805(2)—and not the six-year statute of limitations for breach of contract actions set forth in MCL 600.5807(9). Since Yaghnam waited three years and one day from the date of the crash to file his lawsuit, his claim was barred. The Court of Appeals further held that, despite referencing the possibility of asserting a UM/UIM claim in the future in emails to Michigan Insurance Company, Yaghnam failed to comply with the three-year notice requirement for UM/UIM claims set forth in his policy, and that any amendment to his complaint to include a breach of contract claim would be futile.

Synergy Spine and Orthopedic Surgery Center, LLC, et al v American Country Ins Co (COA – UNP 7/15/2021; RB #4292)
In this unanimous unpublished per curiam decision (Kelly, concurring), the Court of Appeals affirmed the trial court’s various rulings before, during, and after trial in Plaintiffs Synergy Spine and Orthopedic Center, LLC and Silver Pine Imaging, LLC’s (“Plaintiffs,” collectively, or “Plaintiff Synergy” and “Plaintiff Silver Pine,” individually) first-party action against Defendant American Country Insurance Company (“American Country”).

Smith v Everest Nat’l Ins Co, et al (COA – UNP 7/1/2021; RB #4291)
In this unanimous unpublished per curiam opinion, the Court of Appeals reversed the trial court’s summary disposition order dismissing Plaintiff Terry L. Smith’s first-party action against Defendant Everest National Insurance Company (“Everest”). Smith was performing maintenance on a tow truck when it rolled over onto his body and injured him, thus the Court of Appeals held that a question of fact existed as to whether the tow truck was parked at the time of the accident for purposes of MCL 500.3106. As a result, the Court also held that summary disposition was improperly granted under MCL 500.3106(2)(a), because whether that statute operated to bar Smith’s claim for no-fault PIP benefits turned on whether the vehicle was, in fact, parked at the time of the accident.

Buford v Esurance Prop & Cas Ins Co (COA – UNP 6/24/2021; RB #4290)
In this unanimous unpublished per curiam decision, the Court of Appeals affirmed the trial court’s summary disposition order dismissing Plaintiff Vivian Buford’s first-party action against Defendant Esurance Property & Casualty Insurance Company (“Esurance”). The Court of Appeals held that Buford failed to present sufficient evidence to create a question of fact as to whether her claimed injuries were caused by the subject motor vehicle collision pursuant to MCL 500.3105(1).

Breece v Johnson, et al (COA – UNP 6/24/2021; RB #4289)
In this unanimous unpublished per curiam decision, the Court of Appeals affirmed the trial court’s denial of Citizens Insurance Company of the Midwest’s (“Citizens”) motion for summary disposition, in which Citizens sought dismissal of Plaintiffs Shaina Breece and Detroit Medical Center’s (“DMC”) first-party action. The Court of Appeals also affirmed the trial court’s denial of DMC’s motion for summary disposition, in which DMC asked that the court rule as, a matter of law, that the amounts it charged for the treatment it provided to her after the subject motor vehicle collision were reasonable for purposes of the no-fault act. With respect to Citizens’s motion, the Court of Appeals held that the trial court did not abuse its discretion in denying Citizens’ attempt to rescind the policy under which Shaina was covered at the time of the collision after Citizens discovered that Shaina’s mother had committed fraud in its procurement. Shaina was an innocent third-party to the fraud and the trial court did not abuse its discretion in concluding that a balancing of the equities weighed against rescission of the policy with respect to Shaina. Regarding DMC’s motion, the Court of Appeals held that a genuine issue of material fact existed as to whether DMC’s charges were reasonable, notwithstanding the fact that DMC subjected those charges to an independent audit. The Court reasoned that “[t]he amount determined to be compensable by [the auditing entity] was relevant evidence of reasonableness, but was not dispositive of the issue.”

Mich Institute of Pain and Headache, et al v State Farm Mutual Automobile Insurance Company (COA – UNP 6/24/2021; RB #4288)
In this unanimous unpublished per curiam decision, the Court of Appeals reversed the trial court’s summary disposition order dismissing Plaintiff Michigan Institute of Pain and Headache, PC’s (“Metro Pain Clinic”) first-party action against Defendant State Farm Mutual Automobile Insurance Company (“State Farm”). State Farm remitted only partial payment of the total amounts Metro Pain Clinic charged its patient and assignor, Bassam Honeini, for the treatment he received after he was injured in a motor vehicle collision, then argued that Metro Pain Clinic could not pursue the outstanding balance in litigation because Honeini had not “incurred” those charges for purposes of the no-fault act. Essentially, State Farm argued that, because Honeini had not personally suffered any damage or loss by the partial payments—i.e. been sued by Metro Pain Clinic for the outstanding balance—he had no basis, himself, to pursue the outstanding balance from State Farm, and thus neither did Metro Pain Clinic as his assignee. The Court of Appeals disagreed, holding that Honeini “incurred” the full amounts charged by Metro Pain Clinic once he accepted treatment, and that Metro Pain Clinic, as his assignee, could therefore pursue the balance of what was paid and what was charged from State Farm.

Estate of Audisho, et al v Everest Nat’l Ins Co (COA – UNP 6/24/2021; RB #4286)
In this unanimous unpublished per curiam decision, the Court of Appeals affirmed the trial court’s denial of Defendant Everest National Insurance Company’s (“Everest”) motion for summary disposition, in which it sought dismissal of Plaintiff Estate of Yacoub Audisho, Salima Audisho, and Sky 1 Transport’s (“Sky 1”) first-party action. The Court of Appeals held that the trial court did not err in concluding that a question of fact existed as to whether Yacoub accepted rescission of his no-fault policy by cashing the refund check Everest sent him after it determined that he had committed fraud in the procurement of his policy. The Court of Appeals further held that a balancing of the equities weighed against allowing Everest to rescind Yacoub’s policy with respect to Salima, his wife, and an innocent third-party to Yacoub’s alleged fraud. As a result, the Court of Appeals remanded to the trial court to enter an order granting summary disposition to Salima on that issue.

Whitaker v Rigel, et al (COA - UNP 6/17/2021; RB #4285)
In this unanimous unpublished per curiamdecision, the Court of Appeals affirmed the trial court’s summary disposition order dismissing Plaintiff Laurie Whitaker’s third-party action against Defendants Taylor Rose Rigel and Rodney Wayne Rigel. The Court of Appeals held that Whitaker failed to present sufficient evidence to create a genuine issue of material fact as to whether her back injuries were caused by the subject motor vehicle collision and not merely the result of her pre-existing, degenerative back injuries.

Auto Club Ins Assoc v Corporate Limousine Inc, et al (COA – UNP 6/17/2021; RB #4280)
In this unanimous unpublished per curiam decision, the Court of Appeals affirmed the trial court’s various rulings in favor of Plaintiff Auto Club Insurance Association (“Auto Club”) n Auto Club’s underlying action against Defendant American Country Insurance Company (“American Country”). American Country insured a motor vehicle that struck and injured a pedestrian, Brian Miller, who subsequently sought PIP benefits through the Michigan Assigned Claims Plan (“MACP”), which in turn assigned his claim to Auto Club. After paying approximately $635,232.15 in PIP benefits to Miller, Auto Club filed its lawsuit against American Country, asserting that American Country was liable to reimburse it for all amounts paid to Miller plus future amounts incurred by Miller for his collision-related injuries. The trial court issued numerous rulings in favor of Auto Club, all of which were affirmed by the Court of Appeals. Specifically, the Court of Appeals held that Miller was not domiciled at his father’s residence on the date of the collision, which would have rendered his father’s insurer, Auto Owners Insurance Company (“Auto Owners”), a higher priority insurer than American Country. The Court of Appeals next held that the trial court properly considered the innocent third-party doctrine and balanced the equities between Auto Club and American Country in disallowing American Country from rescinding the policy that covered the subject motor vehicle on the basis of fraud. Lastly, the Court of Appeals held that the trial court did not err in ruling that the doctrine of laches did not operate to bar Auto Club’s action against American Country, because even though Auto Club waited five years to file its action, the applicable statute of limitations for insurer reimbursement actions is six years, and the doctrine of laches is simply inapplicable where a complaint is filed within the applicable statute of limitations.

Hauanio, et al v Smith, et al (COA -UNP 6/17/2021; RB #4282)
In this unanimous unpublished per curiam decision, the Court of Appeals affirmed the trial court’s summary disposition order dismissing Plaintiff Janet Hauanio’s first-party action against the Michigan Automobile Insurance Placement Facility (“MAIPF”), as well as the trial court’s denial of Hauanio’s motion to amend her complaint to substitute Farmers Insurance Exchange (“Farmers”) as a party in place of the MAIPF. The Court of Appeals held that Hauanio could not proceed with a direct action against the MAIPF because an injured person claiming benefits through the MAIPF can only sue the MAIPF for PIP benefits directly if it fails to assign his or her claim, and in this case, the MAIPF did not fail to assign Hauanio’s claim. Additionally, the Court held that Hauanio could not amend her complaint to substitute Farmers for the MAIPF because MCL 500.3174 requires that an injured person seeking benefits through the MAIPF commence an action against the assignee insurer within 30 days of assignment, and in this case, Hauanio failed to do so.

Turner v Auto-Owners Ins Co (COA - UNP 6/17/2021; RB #4283)
In this unanimous unpublishedper curiam decision, the Court of Appeals affirmed the trial court’s summary disposition order dismissing Shanti Turner’s first-party no-fault action against Defendant Auto-Owners Insurance Company (“Auto-Owners”). Turner named Auto-Owners as the only defendant in this case, despite the fact that she was actually insured by Home-Owners Insurance Company (“Home-Owners”) at the time of the subject motor vehicle collision, and did not seek to amend her complaint to substitute Home-Owners until more than one year after the subject collision. Therefore, the Court of Appeals held that Turner’s claims against Home-Owners were barred by the one-year-back rule, and that Turner could not rely on the “so-called misnomer doctrine” in attempting to relate an amendment to her complaint naming the correct entity back to the filing date of her original action.

Harmon v Ewing, et al (COA – UNP 6/10/2021; RB #4278)
In this 2-1 unpublished per curiam decision (Stephens, dissenting), the Court of Appeals affirmed the trial court’s summary disposition order dismissing Plaintiff Jasmine Harmon’s third-party action against Defendants Tomas James Ewing, Thomas E. Mason, and Julia Lynn Everett. The Court of Appeals held that Harmon failed to present sufficient evidence to create a question of fact as to whether she suffered a serious impairment of body function as a result of the crash—specifically, whether she suffered an objectively manifested impairment.

Yang v Everest Nat’l Ins Co, et al (MSC – PUB; 06/10/2021; RB #4319)
In this unanimous opinion by Justice Bernstein, the Supreme Court held that “under MCL 500.3020(1)(b), a cancellation notice is effective only if it is peremptory, explicit, and unconditional. The Court then concluded that a cancellation letter by Everest National was ineffective “because Everest’s letter provided that cancellation was conditioned upon Yang’s failure to pay his insurance premiums.

Peters v Auto Club Ins Assoc, et al (UNP - COA 6/10/2021; RB #4279)
In this unanimous unpublished per curiam decision, the Court of Appeals reversed the trial court’s summary disposition order dismissing Plaintiff Kara Peters’s first-party action against Defendant Auto Club Insurance Association (“Auto Club”). Primarily at issue in this case was a billing statement from Peters’s medical providers which indicated an outstanding “insurer balance” of $83,855.20, but an outstanding “patient balance of “$-.” The trial court held this billing statement to mean that Peters had not “incurred” any charges for purposes of the no-fault act, because she had not been billed directly. The Court of Appeals reversed the trial court’s ruling, holding that Peters “incurred” the charges from her providers at the moment she accepted treatment, “even if payment was expected from an insurer rather than from [Peters],” as was perhaps suggested by the aforementioned billing statement.

St. John Hosp & Med Ctr, et al v Nationwide Mut Fire Ins Co, et al (COA – UNP 6/10/2021; RB #4277)
In this unanimous unpublished per curiam decision, the Court of Appeals reversed the trial court’s judgment entered in favor of Defendant/Cross-Plaintiff Nationwide Mutual Fire Insurance Company (“Nationwide”) after a jury trial and remanded for entry of judgment of no cause of action in favor of Defendant/Cross-Defendant Home-Owners Insurance Company (“Home-Owners”). A priority dispute arose as to who owned the motor vehicle involved in the subject crash, and therefore whether Nationwide—to whom the Michigan Assigned Claims Plan assigned Plaintiff St. John Hospital and Medical Center’s (“St. John”) claim for no-fault PIP benefits—or Home-Owners—the insurer of the vehicle’s previous owner who, Nationwide argued, failed to properly transfer title to its new, uninsured owner who was driving it at the time of the subject crash—was the highest priority insurer for purposes of MCL 500.3114. The Court of Appeals held that Home-Owners’ insured properly transferred title before the subject crash by complying with the requirements of MCL 257.233(9), and therefore that Home-Owners fell outside of the no-fault act’s priority rules.

Banks, et al v Williams, et al (COA - UNP 6/10/2021; RB #4276)
In this unanimous unpublished per curiam opinion, the Court of Appeals reversed the trial court’s denial of Defendant National Liability & Fire Insurance Company’s (“National”) motion for summary disposition in which it sought to dismiss Plaintiff Natalie Banks’s first-party action against it and rescind her commercial automobile insurance policy on the basis of fraud in the policy’s procurement. The Court of Appeals held that Banks did, in fact, misrepresent that the covered vehicle’s intended purpose was for use in her cosmetic business when she filled out her application for coverage, and that rescission of the policy was therefore warranted.

LaTarte, et al v Harris (COA – UNP 6/3/2021; RB #4275)
In this majority unpublished per curiam decision (Jansen, dissenting), the Court of Appeals affirmed the trial court’s denial of Defendant Deshawn Harris’s motion for summary disposition in which he sought to dismiss Plaintiff Mary LaTarte’s third-party lawsuit on governmental immunity grounds. The Court held that a question of fact existed as to whether Harris, a Saginaw City police officer, acted with gross negligence in causing the subject motor vehicle collision.

Wilson v Titan Ins Co, et al (UNP - COA 5/27/2021; RB #4273)
In this unanimous unpublished per curiam decision (Swartzle, concurring), the Court of Appeals affirmed the trial court’s summary disposition order dismissing Plaintiff Tamika Wilson’s first-party action against Defendant Titan Insurance Company (“Titan”). The Court of Appeals held that Wilson was barred from seeking no-fault PIP benefits through the Michigan Assigned Claims Plan (“MACP”) for injuries she sustained in the subject motor vehicle collision because she committed a fraudulent insurance act for purposes of MCL 500.3173a(2).

Bronner, et al v City of Detroit, et al (SC – PUB 5/27/2021; RB #4271)
In this 7-0 decision (Viviano concurring), the Michigan Supreme Court upheld an indemnification provision in a contract between Defendant City of Detroit (“City of Detroit” or “the City”) and Defendant GFL Environmental USA Inc. (“GFL”). At issue in this case was an indemnification agreement between the City of Detroit and GFL, whereby GFL agreed to indemnify the City against any liabilities it incurred as a result of GFL or its employees’ negligence. After a GFL garbage truck driver struck a City of Detroit bus and forced the City to have to pay PIP benefits to its passenger who was injured as a result of the collision, the City sought reimbursement from GFL pursuant to the indemnification agreement. The Supreme Court held that the indemnification agreement was valid after examining the various appellate cases which address the enforceability of provisions in no-fault insurance contracts pertaining to matters not specifically covered in the no-fault act. Based on the reasoning of those cases, the Supreme Court held that the subject indemnification provision was enforceable because it did not conflict with any of the no-fault act’s statutory sections or with the legislative purpose of the no-fault act, which the Court characterized as “to ensure that there is applicable insurance for accidents and that benefits get paid.” Justice Viviano agreed with the result reached by the majority but argued that the indemnification agreement at issue was enforceable because it did not conflict with any of the statutory sections of the no-fault act and that the majority should not have focused on the legislative goals and purpose of the no-fault act.

Schutt v Suburban Mobility Auth for Regional Transp, et al (COA – UNP 5/27/2021; RB #4272)
In this unanimous unpublished per curiam decision, the Court of Appeals reversed the trial court’s denial of defendant Suburban Mobility Authority for Regional Transportation’s (SMART) motion for summary disposition, in which SMART sought dismissal of Plaintiff August Schutt’s third-party action against it. The Court of Appeals held that there was no evidence that the driver of the SMART bus on which Schutt was injured drove the bus in a negligent or grossly negligent manner, merely by accelerating before Schutt sat down and braking for a yellow light.

Montpetit v Hopkins (COA - UNP 5/27/2021; RB #4274)
In this unanimous unpublished per curiam decision, the Court of Appeals reversed the trial court’s summary disposition order dismissing Plaintiff Darryl Lee Montepetit’s third-party action against Defendant Chaz Allen Hopkins.  The Court of Appeals held that Montpetit presented sufficient evidence to create a question of fact as to whether he satisfied the first and third prongs of the test for serious impairment of body function set forth in McCormick v Carrier, 487 Mich 180 (2010)—specifically whether his alleged aggravation of his pre-existing neck and back injuries for which he received Social Security Disability before the subject collision constituted an objectively manifested impairment which further affected his general ability to lead his normal life pursuant to the test set forth in McCormick.

Jones v Suburban Mobility Auth for Regional Transp (COA -UNP 5/20/2021; RB #4267)
In this unanimous unpublished per curiamdecision, the Court of Appeals affirmed the trial court’s denial of Defendant Suburban Mobility Authority for Regional Transportation’s (“SMART”) motion for summary disposition in which it sought dismissal of Plaintiff Edward Jones’s third-party lawsuit against it on governmental immunity grounds.  The Court of Appeals, while noting the general rule that bus drivers are not required to wait until patrons reach their seats before accelerating, held that a question of fact existed as to whether Jones’s status as an elderly, physically compromised individual constituted a “special and apparent reason” why SMART’s bus driver should have waited until Jones reached his seat before accelerating, and whether, therefore, the bus driver’s failure to do so was negligence as a matter of law.  Additionally, the Court of Appeals held that a question of fact existed as to whether the bus driver acted negligently by taking her eyes off the road and attending to the operation of the fare machine at the front of the bus while actively driving down the roadway.

Lekli v Farm Bureau Ins of Mich, et al (COA -UNP 5/20/2021; RB #4268)
In this unanimous unpublished per curiam decision, the Court of Appeals affirmed the trial court’s summary disposition order dismissing Syrja  Lekli’s first-party action against Defendants Great American Insurance Company (“Great American”), Farm Bureau Mutual Insurance Company of Michigan (“Farm Bureau”), and the Michigan Automobile Insurance Placement Facility (“MAIPF”).  The Court of Appeals held that Farm Bureau, the insurer of Lekli’s personal vehicles, was properly dismissed from the case because Lekli was driving a vehicle owned by his employer,  Pergjoni Transport (“Pergjoni”), at the time of the crash, and that the insurer of Pergjoni’s vehicle, therefore, was the highest priority insurer pursuant to MCL 500.3114(1).   The Court held that Great American was properly dismissed from the case because, although Great American was one of the insurers  of Pergioni’s vehicle, Great Amercian’s policy contained an enforceable trucking or business use exclusion.   Notably, Lekli did not pursue benefits from or add the other insurer of Pergioni’s vehicle, Hudson Insurance Company (“Hudson”), which presumably would have provided coverage.  Furthermore, regarding the MAIPF, the Court of Appeals held that to whatever extent MAIPF should have remained in the case, Lekli’s attorney explicitly waived keeping the MAIPF in the case once an insurer of higher priority could be identified, which occurred when the trial court determined Hudson was such an insurer, even though Lekli had not pursued benefits through Hudson.

Lippett v Cincinnati Ins Co, et al  (COA – UNP 5/20/2021; RB #4269)
In this unanimous unpublished per curiam decision, the Court of Appeals reversed the trial court’s summary disposition order dismissing Plaintiff Denise Darnell Lippett’s first-party action against Defendant Cincinnati Insurance Company (“Cincinnati”), affirmed the trial court’s summary disposition order dismissing Lippett’s uninsured motorist claim against Cincinnati, and affirmed the trial court’s grant of Defendant Auto-Owners Insurance Company’s (“Auto-Owners”) motion to dismiss Lippett’s action against Auto-Owners.  The Court of Appeals held, with respect to Cincinnati’s motion for summary disposition as to Lippett’s claims for no-fault PIP benefits, that the trial court erred by ruling that Lippett could only recover for the injuries that she explicitly  listed on her original application for benefits after the subject motor vehicle collision, and remanded for further proceedings regarding the evidence that established Lippett may have sustained injuries in addition to those listed on her original application.   MCL 500.3105(1) provides that an injured person can recover for any injuries that arise out of the ownership, operation, maintenance, or use of a motor vehicle as a motor vehicle, and there is nothing in the statute that says an injured person can only recover for the injuries she explicitly enumerates in her original application for benefits.  As for Lippett’s uninsured motorist claim against Cincinnati, the Court of Appeals held that the trial court did not err in ruling that Lippett failed to produce sufficient evidence that the other drivers involved in the subject collision were, in fact, uninsured, and that summary disposition for Cincinnati as to Lippett’s UM claim was therefore properly granted.  With respect to Auto-Owners, the Court of Appeals held that dismissal of Lippett’s claim against Auto-Owners was warranted given Lippett’s counsel’s repeated, willful discovery violations. 

Ferndale Rehab Ctr, et al v Allstate Ins Co (COA - UNP 5/20/2021; RB#4266)
In this unanimous unpublished per curiamopinion, the Court of Appeals affirmed the trial court’ssummary disposition order dismissing Plaintiff Ferndale Rehabilitation Center’s (“FRC”) first-party lawsuit against Defendant Allstate Insurance Company (“Allstate”).  The Court of Appeals held that FRC’s assignor, Tommie Thomas, committed fraud in his application for no-fault PIP benefits through the Michigan Assigned Claims Plan, and that his claim—and FRC’s claims as his assignee—were therefore barred by MCL 500.3173a.

Estate of Baldwin, et al v Estate of Davies, et al (COA - UNP 5/20/2021; RB #4264)
In this unanimous unpublished per curiamdecision, the Court of Appeals affirmed the trial court’s ruling summary disposition order dismissing the plaintiff Estate of Lamereo Baldwin’s negligence action against Defendants Tom Davies Seamless Gutters (“TDSG”) and the defendant Estate of Tom Davies.  The Court of Appeals held first that TDSG had no ownership interest in the motor vehicle involved in the collision, as the insurance policy that covered the vehicle had been transferred to a different entity almost a year prior to the collision.  Therefore, TDSG could not be sued under the Michigan’s owner liability statute, MCL 257.401.  The Court of Appeals held second that the Baldwin Estate could not proceed with its negligent entrustment action against the Davies Estate because it had previously sued Farm Bureau, the insurer of the motor vehicle and Davies’s new corporation, which was named on the policy covering the vehicle, in a separate negligence action based on the same facts.  That case was dismissed after an order of summary disposition was entered in Farm Bureau’s favor, and since Farm Bureau was a privy of the Davies Estate and the same issues raised in the instant action could have been raised in the first action against Farm Bureau, the instant action was barred by the doctrine of res judicata.

Estate of Woolen, et al v City of Detroit (COA - UNP 5/20/2021; RB #4265)
In this unanimous unpublished per curiam decision, the Court of Appeals affirmed the trial court's denial of Defendant City of Detroit's motion for summary disposition, in which the City sought to dismiss Plaintiff Estate of Robert Woolen's third-party action against it. The Court of Appeals held that a question of fact existed as to whether the Woolen Estate's lawsuit implicated the motor-vehicle exception to governmental immunity—more specifically, the Court held that a question of fact existed as to whether the City of Detroit's bus driver acted negligently in abruptly braking and changing lanes in order to allegedly avoid hitting a motor vehicle that pulled out in front of him. The Court also held, based on the facts of the case, that a question of fact existed as to whether the "sudden emergency doctrine" barred the Woolen Estate's cause of action.

Collinson v Meemic Ins Co (COA - UNP 5/20/2021; RB #4263)
In this unpublished per curiam opinion, the Court of Appeals affirmed the trial court’s summary disposition order dismissing Plaintiff Michael Collinson’s first-party action for survivor’s loss benefits after his mother, Janice Collinson, was killed in a fatal car crash.  The Court of Appeals held that Collinson, who was 26 years old at the time of Janice Collinson’s death, , was not physically or mentally incapacitated from earning and therefore neither a conclusively presumed dependent for purposes of the no-fault act.  Furthermore, the Court of Appeals held that the facts regarding Plaintiff’s inability to maintain employment and earn his own income as they existed at the time of Janice Collinson’s death did not support a finding that Michael Collinson was her dependent under MCL 500.3110.

Baum v Auto-Owners Ins Co, et al, (COA – UNP 5/20/2021; RB #4262)
In this unanimous unpublished per curiam decision, the Court of Appeals affirmed the trial court’s summary disposition orderdismissing Plaintiff James Baum’s first-party action against Defendant Home-Owners Insurance Company (“Home-Owners”).  After the subject motor vehicle collision, Baum sought work-loss benefits from Home-Owners, testifying that he was temporarily laid off at the time of the collision.  Home-Owners argued that Baum’s testimony constituted fraud and justified voidance of the subject policy, highlighting an affidavit from Baum’s supervisor in which his supervisor averred that Baum had been permanently laid off at the time of the crash.  The Court of Appealsheld that a question of fact existed as to whether Baum was ever actually notified of his being permanently laid off, and therefore whether his misrepresentation was made knowingly.  The Court affirmed the trial court’s summary disposition order in favor of Home-Owners anyways, however, holding that Baum failed to mitigate his damages and seek out new employment despite being cleared to do so.

Advance Pain Care, PLLC v Trumbull Ins Co (COA – UNP 5/13/2021; RB #4261)
In this unanimous unpublishedper curiamopinion, the Court of Appeals affirmed summary disposition for Defendant Trumbull Insurance on the issue of assignment enforceability because, Advance Pain failed to properly put Trumbull on notice of its assigned rightsby providing only bills for services.

Wilmore-Moody v Zakir, et al (UNP – COA 5/6/2021; RB #4260)
In this unanimous unpublished per curiam decision, the Court of Appeals affirmed the trial court’s summary disposition order dismissing Plaintiff Adora Wilmore-Moody’s first-party action against Defendant Everest National Insurance Company (“Everest”), but reversed the trial court’s summary disposition order dismissing Wilmore-Moody’s third-party action against Defendant Mohammed Zakir. The Court of Appeals held that the trial court was justified in rescinding Wilmore-Moody’s automobile insurance policy with Everest based on fraudulent statements Wilmore-Moody made in procuring the policy. The Court of Appeals also held, however, that permitting Everest to rescind the policy ab initio did not “alter the past” and mean that Wilmore-Moody did not actually have insurance at the time of the collision. In other words, she was not actually an uninsured person at the time of the collision for purposes of MCL 500.3135(2)(c), and therefore not barred from pursuing her third-party claim against Zakir.

Salinas v Hayes, et al (COA – UNP 5/6/2021; RB #4259)
In this unanimous unpublished per curiam decision, the Court of Appeals reversed the trial court’s summary disposition order dismissing Plaintiff Fransisco Salinas’s third-party action against Defendants Joanne Hayes and Michigan Millers Mutual Insurance Company (“MMMIC”) and remanded for further proceedings. The Court of Appeals held that Salinas presented sufficient evidence to create a question of fact as to whether the subject motor vehicle collision caused him to suffer an objectively manifested impairment, and that the trial court erred in weighing the evidence and disregarding Salinas’s experts’ testimonies in favor of MMMIC’s experts’ testimonies on a motion for summary disposition.


Lansing car accident lawyer Stephen Sinas is the lead editor of the appellate case summaries published on this site regarding the Michigan auto insurance law. To learn more about how Stephen Sinas and how the Sinas Dramis Law Firm can help you if you have been injured in a Michigan auto accident, visit SinasDramis.com.

Copyright © 2021 Sinas Dramis Law Firm, George Sinas, Stephen Sinas.
All Rights Reserved.
Login (Publishers Only)

FacebookTwitterInstagram