Michigan Court of Appeals; Docket # 345800; Unpublished
Judges Gleicher, Sawyer, and Meter; Per curiam
Official Michigan Reporter Citation: Not Applicable; Link to Opinion
STATUTORY INDEXING:
Determination of Domicile [§3114(1)]
TOPICAL INDEXING:
Not Applicable
SUMMARY:
In this unanimous unpublished per curiam decision, the Court of Appeals reversed the trial court’s summary disposition order dismissing the plaintiff’s first-party no-fault action and remanded for further proceedings. The Court of Appeals held that the trial court erred in ruling, as a matter of law, that the plaintiff, Alvin Leonard Smith, was not domiciled with his mother at the time of the collision, and was therefore precluded from receiving no-fault PIP benefits under an automobile insurance policy issued to her by the defendant, Progressive Marathon Insurance Company. Specifically, the Court of Appeals held that the trial court conflated “residency” and “domicile” in its application of MCL 500.3114(1) to the facts of this case.
Smith was driving a 2000 Ford Explorer that he owned when he was involved in a motor vehicle collision. The Explorer was insured under his mother’s policy with Progressive, and after Progressive denied Smith’s claim for PIP benefits under the policy, Smith commenced the underlying first-party action. Progressive moved for summary disposition, arguing that Smith was barred from receiving PIP benefits because he failed to personally maintain insurance on his vehicle, and that Smith was barred from coverage under his mother’s policy because he was not domiciled with her at the time of the collision. Central to Progressive’s argument in the latter regard were admissions by Smith that he was residing with his girlfriend, not his mother, at the time of the collision. Ultimately, the trial court granted summary disposition in Progressive’s favor.
The Court of Appeals reversed the trial court’s summary disposition, noting firstly that at the time of summary disposition, the issue of whether Smith was required to personally maintain no-fault insurance was controlled by the Court’s decision in Barnes v. Farmers Ins. Exchange, 308 Mich. App. 1; 862 NW2d 681 (2014). While the case was pending on appeal, however, the Michigan Supreme Court overruled Barnes in Dye v. Esurance Prop. & Cas. Ins. Co., 504 Mich. 167 (2019), holding that “a vehicle owner’s statutory obligation to maintain insurance on the vehicle does not require that the owner personally procure the insurance.”
As to the issue of Smith’s domicile at the time of the collision, the Court of Appeals noted that the trial court erroneously conflated the concepts of “residency” and “domicile.” Central to the trial court’s ruling was an “admission” by Smith that he was living with his girlfriend at the time of the collision. The Court of Appeals noted, however, that Smith only “admitted” that he was “living” with his girlfriend at the time of the collision after being asked a compound question during his deposition, in which defense counsel asked both “where were you living” and “what was your domicile.” The Court noted that those two questions did not deal with the same concept, and that their coupling perhaps confused Smith into thinking otherwise. Thus, the Court of Appeals held that Smith’s admission that he was living with his girlfriend, in response to that compound question, did not necessarily count as an admission that his domicile had changed from his mother’s residence to his girlfriend’s. Therefore, summary disposition was improper.
It is the last question and answer that Progressive argues constitutes an “admission”. We are not so persuaded. As we have discussed at some length, “domicile” holds a special meaning in the law. Indeed, in Grange, not only did the Supreme Court spend considerable time discussing the meaning of that term, it also concluded that both this Court and the trial court in that case misinterpreted the term. Yet Progressive would have us conclude that plaintiff, who has no legal education, could accurately answer the question of what was his domicile without even being given a definition or context. Indeed, the limited context that was given in the question was erroneous. That is, it was a compound question that linked “where were you living” with “what was your domicile,” suggesting that the two concepts are the same. And, as we’ve discussed at length, they are not. This exchange is hardly an admission of domicile. At best, it is one fact of many regarding where he was residing at the time of the accident. Ultimately, defendant overlooks the fact that the purpose of the deposition was not to obtain plaintiff’s legal opinions, but to suss out the facts that would potentially allow the court to decide the question of domicile.