Michigan Court of Appeals; Docket # 341598; Unpublished
Judges Ronayne Krause, Meter, and Stephens; Per curiam
Official Michigan Reporter Citation: Not Applicable; Link to Opinion
STATUTORY INDEXING:
Not Applicable
TOPICAL INDEXING:
Evidentiary Issues
SUMMARY:
In this unanimous unpublished per curiam decision, the Court of Appeals affirmed a judgment awarding no damages to the plaintiff, the Estate of William D. Xerri (“the Estate”), following a jury determination that the decedent, William D. Xerri (“Xerri”), was more than 50% at fault for the subject motor vehicle collision. On appeal, the Estate argued that the trial court abused its discretion by excluding evidence of (1) an unrelated drug test in which the defendant tested positive for amphetamines, (2) a letter from defense counsel to the local sheriff’s department, and (3) an animated collision reenactment video that the Estate sought to use a demonstrative aid. The Estate also argued that the Court abused its discretion in admitting evidence that some of Xerri’s family members recommended he install hand controls in his vehicle prior to the subject collision. For various reasons, the Court of Appeals held that the trial court did not abuse its discretion in regards to any of these evidentiary determinations, and, that even if it had, any such abuses did not deny the Estate a fair trial.
Xerri was killed in a motor vehicle collision and his estate subsequently filed a wrongful-death automobile negligence action against the other driver, Patrick Anthony Williams (“Williams”), and the owner of the other driver’s garbage truck. Following a jury trial, Xerri was deemed to have been 60% at fault for the collision, and the defendants were thus awarded a judgment of no damages. The Estate subsequently appealed several evidentiary rulings made by the trial court.
First, the Estate argued that the trial court abused its discretion by excluding evidence of a drug test—taken four months after the subject collision—in which Williams tested positive for amphetamines. Williams also tested positive for amphetamines on the date of the collision, but the Court noted that there was no evidence that he was actually impaired at that time. The Estate attempted to present the evidence of the later test to cast light on Williams’s habitual drug usage, but the Court of Appeals held that the later test was irrelevant and that there was no evidence that Williams’s alleged habitual drug use affected his driving on the date in question.
We find plaintiff’s argument regarding the relevance of the drug test difficult to follow, but apparently plaintiff believes it would cast light on Williams’s habitual use or nonuse of amphetamines. However, the primary issue at trial was who had been negligent in the December 20, 2013 motor vehicle accident. Plaintiff claimed that Williams was negligent in turning left at the intersection, whereas defendants’ position was that Williams had the right-of-way when he turned left. It was undisputed at trial that Williams tested positive for amphetamines on the date of the accident. There was, however, no evidence that Williams was impaired at the time of the accident, and two witnesses who talked to Williams at the accident scene testified that he did not seem impaired. The fact that Williams tested positive for amphetamines again four months after the accident does not help establish whether Williams was impaired at the time of the accident. Because it is undisputed that Williams had amphetamines in his body on the date of the accident, the fact that he tested positive again four months later was simply irrelevant. There was no evidence connecting any habitual drug use to Williams’s decision to turn left, particularly given the lack of evidence that Williams was impaired at the time of the accident.
Second, the Estate argued that the trial court abused its discretion in excluding a letter from defense counsel to the local sheriff’s department. The letter concerned research conducted by the defense to support its theory that perhaps Williams’s drug test results were a false positive. The Court of Appeals determined that the trial court properly excluded such evidence because such evidence did not tend to make any material fact more or less probable. Moreover, even if the trial court had erred in excluding the letter, such an abuse would not have denied the Estate a fair trial.
In any event, the trial court’s determination that this letter was not relevant fell within the range of reasonable and principled outcomes. In the April 23, 2014 letter to the Monroe County Sheriff’s Department reflects purported medical and pharmacological research conducted by defense counsel to support the conclusion that Williams’s legal use of over-the-counter medicine could have created a false positive result for amphetamines. It was undisputed at trial that Williams tested positive for amphetamines on the accident date, and the defense did not present any theory at trial that Williams’s test result was a false positive. Defense counsel’s assertions in the letter do not tend to make any material fact more probable or less probable. Further, the trial court reasonably concluded that admission of this letter would unduly confuse the jury, given that the letter could incorrectly be viewed as reflecting defense counsel’s expertise about the medical or pharmacological research that defense counsel said he conducted.
However, even if the trial court had erred in excluding defense counsel’s letter, the error did not cause substantial prejudice that denied plaintiff a fair trial. See Mitchell, 321 Mich App at 157-158. Although the letter was not admitted at trial, the key information contained in the letter was made known to the jury through Williams’s testimony. Williams admitted at trial that he told the general manager of Stevens that Williams was taking a medicine that Williams thought could have caused the positive drug test. Williams admitted at trial that he is now aware that two toxicologists have indicated that the medicine would not cause a positive test for amphetamines. The jury was thus made aware that Williams had once suggested that the medicine could result in a false positive test result, and it was also made aware that the medicine actually would not cause a false positive. The jury nonetheless determined that Williams was less than 50% at fault in the accident. There is no reason to believe that admission of the letter would have changed the outcome of the trial.
Third, the Estate argued that the trial court abused its discretion when it refused to allow the Estate to show an animated video purportedly depicting the motor vehicle accident at trial. Three eyewitnesses testified regarding the same events as would have been depicted in the animated video, and thus the Court of Appeals held that the trial court did not abuse its discretion in determining that the eyewitnesses’ testimonies were sufficient for helping the jury understand what occurred.
The trial court’s declination to allow the use of an animated video as a demonstrative aid did not fall outside the range of reasonable and principled outcomes. Plaintiff argues that the video would have helped the jury understand the locations of the vehicles and the rapid timing of events before the accident. However, three eyewitnesses testified regarding the events surrounding the accident. The trial court correctly observed that the testimony was sufficiently clear and that there was no technical issue involved that required the use of a demonstrative aid. The jury heard the testimony of the eyewitnesses and did not need an animated video to understand what occurred. The trial court thus did not abuse its discretion in disallowing the use of this video.3
Furthermore, even if the trial court had erred in barring the use of this video as a demonstrative aid, such an error did not result in substantial prejudice that denied plaintiff a fair trial. See Mitchell, 321 Mich App at 157-158; see also MCR 2.613(A). Again, the jury heard the testimony of the eyewitnesses to the accident. There is no reason to believe that an animated video purporting to depict what the eyewitnesses clearly described would have altered the outcome of the trial.
Lastly, the Estate argued that the trial court abused its discretion by admitting evidence that some of Xerri’s family members had recommended that Xerri install hand controls in his vehicle. The Court of Appeals again disagreed, finding that the family members’ concerns about Xerri’s driving ability perhaps explained why Xerri was unable to brake before the collision.
Some of decedent’s family members testified about their observations of how decedent drove his vehicle following the amputation of his right leg. Decedent sat awkwardly in his vehicle in order to use his left foot to apply the brake and the gas pedal. Decedent’s family members testified about their concerns and their suggestions to decedent that he obtain hand controls for his vehicle. Plaintiff argues this testimony should not have been admitted because there is no evidence that decedent’s failure to obtain and use hand controls caused the accident. However, there was undisputed evidence at trial that decedent failed to apply his brakes before the accident, even though another driver going the same direction as decedent and who was further ahead of decedent stopped at the intersection as the light was changing. The testimony of decedent’s family members regarding their observations of his driving and their concerns about how he drove, which were intertwined with their recommendations to him to get hand controls, offers a possible explanation for why decedent’s left foot failed to hit the brake pedal. The trial court’s decision to admit the evidence fell within the range of reasonable and principled outcomes.
